Delegating National Security by Knowles, Robert
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 98 Issue 4 
2021 
Delegating National Security 
Robert Knowles 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of 
the United States Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert Knowles, Delegating National Security, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2021). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol98/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 












DELEGATING NATIONAL SECURITY 
ROBERT KNOWLES* 
ABSTRACT 
Conservative scholars and a Supreme Court majority support reviving 
the nondelegation doctrine as a way to downsize the administrative state. 
But proposals from these scholars and Justices inevitably maintain there 
should be an exception for national security.  
This Article explains why a national security exception defeats the 
nondelegation doctrine’s goals of preserving the separation of powers and 
individual liberty. In doing so, this Article charts the ways the national 
security state regulates and accounts for its immunity from the harshest 
attacks on the administrative state. This Article also predicts how this 
dynamic would affect a nondelegation revival.  
This Article begins by offering a new model depicting agency lawmaking 
in national security. It draws on insights from military-industrial complex 
theory, which has received scant attention from legal scholars. What I call 
the military-administrative complex uses threat-inflation to obtain 
increased regulatory authority over individuals, including American 
civilians. As its reach expands, the boundary between domestic and national 
security regulation fades.  
Next, this Article describes why presidential control theory—which 
grounds the legitimacy of delegation in the President’s political 
accountability and oversight—cannot justify a national security exception. 
The military-administrative complex is so entrenched and insulated that 
even the President must delegate vast discretion to agencies within it.  
Finally, this Article scrutinizes the sources the Justices themselves cite 
to support their nondelegation arguments. If the Court adopted the 
reasoning in these sources, this Article predicts, a revived nondelegation 
doctrine with a national security exception would be inherently unstable. 
Ever-expanding definitions of “national security” could allow the exception 
to swallow the rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States government’s national security activities should raise 
profound nondelegation concerns.1 Congress gives agencies in that realm 
 
1. Under the nondelegation doctrine, Congress violates the Constitution when it delegates 
rulemaking authority to agencies without an “intelligible principle” to guide the exercise of discretion. 
See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see also Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (construing the text of a delegation to place constitutionally-
adequate “limits on the EPA’s discretion”). Delegation of adjudicatory power can also raise 
nondelegation concerns. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 
131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1961–64 (2018). So can delegation to private entities. See Jody Freeman, The 












maximal discretion and minimal scrutiny. 2  On this permissive legal 
armature has grown the world’s largest bureaucracy.3  
That bureaucracy engages in profuse rulemaking and adjudication—the 
meat and drink of administrative agencies.4 It works hand in glove with a 
vast network of private contractors who perform many critical national 
security functions. And it increasingly regulates individuals, including 
American civilians.5  
I call the combination of this bureaucracy and its private contractors the 
military-administrative complex (MAC).6 Although there is a rich literature 
on presidential authority in national security,7 the independent behavior of 
regulating agencies in that space has just begun to receive attention from 
legal scholars. 8  And there has been no comprehensive assessment of 
 
2. See infra Part II; see also Oona A. Hathaway, National Security Lawyering in the Post-War 
Era: Can Law Constrain Power? (Yale L. Sch. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper, 2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssr 
n.3530588 [https://perma.cc/Y2LF-ECXX]. 
3. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock & Bob Woodward, Pentagon Buries Evidence of $125 Billion in 
Bureaucratic Waste, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/pent 
agon-buries-evidence-of-125-billion-in-bureaucratic-waste/2016/12/05/e0668c76-9af6-11e6-a0ed-ab0 
774c1eaa5_story.html [https://perma.cc/L5H7-ENEV]. 
4. See generally Robert Knowles, Warfare as Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1953 (2017) 
[hereinafter Knowles, Warfare] (modeling U.S. national security activities as forms of regulation and 
applying administrative law principles); cf. Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 91, 92–95 (2016) (describing “panvasive” surveillance as regulation). See also City of 
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013) (“Agencies make rules (‘Private cattle may be grazed 
on public lands X, Y, and Z subject to certain conditions’) and conduct adjudications (‘This rancher’s 
grazing permit is revoked for violation of the conditions’) and have done so since the beginning of the 
Republic.”). 
5. See infra Part II.A; see also William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of 
Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1634 (2010). 
6. The term is, of course, adapted from “military-industrial complex.” See infra Part III.A; see 
also Dwight D. Eisenhower, Military-Industrial Complex Speech (1961) [hereinafter Farewell Address], 
in THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/eisenhower001.asp [https://perma.cc 
/R8YV-LKE7]. 
7. See generally, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the 
Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 
(2008); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE 
IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); Amy L. Stein, A Statutory National Security President, 70 FLA. L. REV. 
1183 (2018); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding 
of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996). 
8. See, e.g., Elena Chachko, Administrative National Security, 108 GEO. L.J. 1063 (2020) 
(describing certain national security activities aimed at individuals as forms of administrative 
adjudication); Knowles, Warfare, supra note 4, at 1965. Other scholars have identified a family 
resemblance between the military and intelligence communities and the rest of the administrative state. 
See Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 
799 (2012) (“[T]he modern military in many ways enjoys the functional advantages, now long embraced, 
of administrative agencies.”); Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 
637-38 (2016) (“[T]here is a lot to recommend the analogy between the intelligence apparatus and the 
administrative state.”). 











national security’s significance for recent debates about the constitutionality 
of the administrative state as a whole.9  
This Article supplies such an assessment, which is long overdue. The 
near absence of national security from the debate so far is striking. For one 
thing, the MAC is immense and growing. Its public side includes the 
Departments of Defense, State, and Homeland Security; the National 
Security Council; the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and more than a 
thousand other sub-agencies. 10  These entities employ millions. 11  Their 
activities account for more than half of all federal discretionary spending.12  
Moreover, the rise of this regulatory behemoth represents an expansion 
of the administrative state even as other parts of it are under siege. 13 
Deregulatory fervor, budget cuts, and public mistrust of government have 
weakened agency authority.14 Trump appointees set out to “deconstruct[] 
the administrative state.”15 And a Supreme Court majority seems prepared 
to revive the nondelegation doctrine, putting much of that state in legal 
jeopardy.16  
 
9. See infra Part II.A. Harlan Cohen, The National Security Delegation Conundrum, JUST 
SECURITY (July 17, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64946/the-national-security-delegation-conund 
rum/ [https://perma.cc/PEC4-UXXS]. The exception is the immigration space, where some scholars 
have observed that immigrant advocates share with libertarian constitutionalists a common concern 
about administrative overreach. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Immigration Law Allies and Administrative Law 
Adversaries, 32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 99, 99–100 (2017). 
10. See, e.g., DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW 
AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 86 (2011) (reporting that 1074 federal government organizations and 
nearly 2000 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security, and 
intelligence in at least 17,000 locations across the United States). The Department of Justice and the 
White House Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) also play prominent roles in providing justifying legal 
authority for national security activities. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 2. 
11. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT 16 
(2014). 
12. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFF., AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENT’S 2020 BUDGET 9 (2019) 
(noting that the president’s 2020 budget allocates $750 billion for defense discretionary spending and 
$584 billion for nondefense discretionary spending). 
13. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, 1930s Redux]. 
14. See JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 86–101 (2017) [hereinafter MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP]. 
15. See Lisa Heinzerling, Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s 
Deregulatory Binge, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13–14 (2018). 
16. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) 
(statement of Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis 
of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in 
future cases.”) (emphasis omitted); Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1933, 1970 (2017) (“In determining the constitutional validity of the modern administrative state, the 
nondelegation doctrine is the big one.”); Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the 












Those who challenge the administrative state’s constitutionality—I will 
refer to them as constitutional libertarians17—should be disturbed by the 
rise of the military-administrative complex. And yet, for the most part, they 
are not. Constitutional libertarians do not regard very broad delegations of 
national security power as problematic.18 The textual rationale for carving 
out this exception is that, as Justice Gorsuch put it, “[the President] enjoys 
his own inherent Article II powers” in foreign affairs.19 A delegation of 
these Article II powers to agencies, then, cannot be a delegation of 
“legislative” power, no matter how legislative-seeming the nature of those 
powers.20 
This highly formalist logic does little actual work, however.21 Beneath it 
lie functional assumptions springing from a core belief that national security 
is a separate and unique sphere of governance. 22  This Article seeks to 
demonstrate that these assumptions are idealized and obsolete; they fail to 
account for the vast scope and changing nature of the government’s national 
 
17. See infra Part IV; Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. 393, 394–95 (2015) [hereinafter Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law]; 
cf. Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 13, at 1 (referring to them as “anti-administrativists”). Use of the 
term “libertarian” is not entirely fair to the many self-described libertarians who express concern about 
the reach of the U.S. government’s national security activities. See, e.g., Veronique de Rugy, Cutting 
the Pentagon Budget, REASON (July 2010), http://reason.com/archives/2010/06/11/cutting-the-pentagon 
-budget [https://perma.cc/4JYT-ZXN9]. 
18. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Michael B. Rappaport, A Two 
Tiered and Categorical Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine 6 (San Diego Legal Stud. Paper No. 
20-471, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3710048 [https://perma.cc/UMD8-847C] (arguing that the 
Constitution “places no limits or weaker limits on the delegation of policymaking discretion” in 
“traditional areas of executive responsibility, such as foreign and military affairs, spending, and the 
management of government property”). 
19. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
20. See id. at 2137 (“So, for example, when a congressional statute confers wide discretion to the 
executive, no separation-of-powers problem may arise if ‘the discretion is to be exercised over matters 
already within the scope of executive power.’”) (quoting David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: 
Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1260 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, The 
Delegation Doctrine].  
21. Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 20, at 1261. Professor Schoenbrod’s 
article was the only secondary authority Justice Gorsuch cited (and quoted) in explaining the foreign 
affairs exception, and he frequently cited Professor Schoenbrod’s work in setting forth his broader 
argument for reviving the nondelegation doctrine. See, e.g., Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 n.43 (Gorsuch, 
J., dissenting); id. at 2134 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 29 (1993) [hereinafter 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY]). 
22. See infra Part III.C. 











security activities. 23  Nor do they acknowledge the serious threat to 
individual liberty those activities increasingly present.24  
In addition, by maintaining that national security should be exempt from 
the nondelegation doctrine, libertarian constitutionalists undermine their 
own project. They would place on the President’s shoulders the burden of 
both providing clear principles to guide agency discretion and performing 
most oversight functions Congress and the courts ordinarily would. This 
burden is an impossible one.25 The President, too, must delegate very broad 
regulatory authority to the national security bureaucracy.26  
No one understood this reality better than Dwight Eisenhower. His 
famous 1961 warning about the threat to “democratic processes” presented 
by the “military-industrial complex” was in some ways a cry for help.27 
Throughout his career—as military officer, defense bureaucrat, Supreme 
Allied Commander in World War II, and President—he grappled with the 
problem of how to manage the military and its contractors,28 which he came 
to see as interest groups.29 He clashed with them over numerous policies—
even Cold War grand strategy.30 In his Farewell Address, he described the 
 
23. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 150 
(2020) (defining “national security” as “encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the 
United States with the purpose of gaining: a. A military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or 
group of nations; b. A favorable foreign relations position; or c. A defense posture capable of 
successfully resisting hostile or destructive action”); see generally ROSA BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING 
BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING: TALES FROM THE PENTAGON (2016).  
24. Compare Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (recognizing a foreign-affairs 
exception to the nondelegation doctrine but also contending that a statute giving “the Attorney General 
the authority to ‘prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights’ of citizens are determined” is a 
“quintessentially legislative power”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossier ed., 1961)), with Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the 
Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1678 (2009) 
(observing that “every government action is redistributive; the 9/11 response had different effects on 
Muslim Americans and on other Americans”). 
25. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 11; Chachko, supra note 8. But see Rascoff, supra note 8, at 
636–37 (arguing that the President exercised meaningful oversight of much of the intelligence 
community during the Obama administration). 
26. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,333, § 1.7, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended in 50 
U.S.C. § 3001 (2018) (authorizing the NSA to “[c]ollect (including through clandestine means), process, 
analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information and data for foreign intelligence and 
counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions”). 
27. See Farewell Address, supra note 6. I discuss the evolution of the term in Part III.A. See also 
Alex Roland, The Military-Industrial Complex: Lobby and Trope, in THE LONG WAR: A NEW HISTORY 
OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II 335–37 (Andrew J. Bacevich ed., 2007). 
28. I use the term “contractor” broadly to refer to any private entity that supplies the government 
with weapons, equipment, or services, regardless of whether the private entity is performing a traditional 
military function as a result of outsourcing. See LAURA A. DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: 
PRESERVING PUBLIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 9 (2011). 
29. See, e.g., JAMES LEDBETTER, UNWARRANTED INFLUENCE: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER AND 
THE MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 45–131 (2011). 
30. See, e.g., HELEN BURY, EISENHOWER AND THE COLD WAR ARMS RACE: ‘OPEN SKIES’ AND 












“military-industrial complex” as a symbiotic relationship between the 
defense bureaucrats and private firms, who worked together to bend 
national policy toward militarism and extend their domains of influence.31 
Today, empowered by expanding definitions of national security and the 
individualization of warfare and foreign policy,32  the military-industrial 
complex has evolved into a regulating administrative state—the military-
administrative complex (MAC). 33  Take the National Security Agency 
(NSA), for example.34 A Department of Defense (DoD) component led by 
a general who also heads the U.S. Cyber Command, the NSA conducts 
warrantless mass surveillance of American citizens. 35  It works with 
thousands of contractors. And it regulates. It renders an individualized 
determination—adjudication—when it identifies targets for surveillance.36 
It produces broadly-applicable policies—rulemaking—when it prescribes 
how Americans’ personal data may be collected and used.37 Even after 
Congress scaled back the NSA’s formal surveillance authority, moreover, 
the agency has managed to expand its actual regulatory power by obtaining 
data from other agencies and buying it from private brokers.38 The national 
security bureaucracy has long experience adjusting regulatory strategies and 
 
31. See Farewell Address, supra note 6. 
32. See infra Part III.C. See also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: 
Individuating Enemy Responsibility, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2013) (observing the shift from the 
traditional war practice of defining an enemy by a group-based judgment to the current practice, 
requiring individuation of enemy responsibility before military force is justified).  
33. In using this acronym, I follow the practice of political scientists, who abbreviate the 
Military-Industrial Complex as the “MIC.” See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 6. 
34. See Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The NSA . . . is charged 
with, among other tasks, collecting, processing, and disseminating signals intelligence (‘SIGINT’) 
information for national foreign intelligence purposes.”).  
35. See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act of 2008 § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a; Elizabeth Goitein, 
ODNI’s 2019 Statistical Transparency Report: The FBI Violates FISA…Again, JUST SECURITY (May 1, 
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/69972/odnis-2019-statistical-transparency-report-the-fbi-violates-f 
isaagain/ (discussing NSA authority to conduct warrantless “backdoor” searches and the abuse of that 
authority) [https://perma.cc/3LCK-FBT4]; Margaret Hu, Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 1425, 1436 n.38 (2018) (observing that surveillance has become “a tool of governance”); Jack 
M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2297 (2014) 
(“Governments can target for control or surveillance many different aspects of the digital infrastructure 
that people use to communicate . . . .”). 
36. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 35, at 1431–32 (explaining the ways the NSA identifies targets). 
37. These types of rules are known throughout the intelligence community as “minimization 
procedures.” See, e.g., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 
SP0018: LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES (Jan. 25, 2011), https://w 
ww.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf [https://perma.cc/EXT 
3-678F]; Robert Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 883, 904–05 (2014) 
[hereinafter Knowles, National Security Rulemaking].  
38. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren & Michal S. Gal, The Chilling Effect of Governance-by-Data on 
Data Markets, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 403, 411–12 (2019); Sharon Weinberger, Opinion, Private 
Surveillance Is a Lethal Weapon Anybody Can Buy, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.co 
m/2019/07/19/opinion/private-surveillance-industry.html [https://perma.cc/ZU93-6GLE]. 











using private entities to enhance its authority.39 And that authority collides 
more and more often with liberty interests.40 
This Article considers how agencies regulate in the national security 
space, why their regulating remains largely immune from the constitutional 
libertarians’ attack on other areas of administrative action, and the effect of 
this dynamic on the entire administrative state. A comprehensive survey of 
the legal authority for agency regulation in the national security realm 
would exceed the space available here. Nor is it possible in this assessment 
to enumerate all the exercises of agency discretion in that realm. But this 
Article seeks to provide enough examples to demonstrate how broad and 
deep a national security exception to the nondelegation doctrine really is. 
Such an exception injects profound instability into the nondelegation 
doctrine and, along with it, the libertarian constitutionalist reform project. 
Part I provides an overview of the non-delegation doctrine and the 
constitutional libertarian project which has a revival of the doctrine as its 
centerpiece. I emphasize the importance of what one might call the 
penumbral aspect of the nondelegation doctrine: although, as a formal 
matter, the doctrine prohibits delegations lacking “intelligible principles” to 
guide agency discretion, the true function of the nondelegation doctrine is 
more fundamental—to constrain the amount of its power Congress conveys 
to the Executive Branch. 
Part II charts key legal frameworks constituting the MAC. Congress, 
through vague delegations, gives agencies sweeping national security 
rulemaking and adjudicatory authority. 41  At the same time, agencies 
regulate free of most procedural requirements ordinarily imposed on them 
by statutes and executive orders.42 Agency lawmaking occurs with little 
public accountability, often in secret, and with only sporadic judicial 
review. And even as courts are deferring less to agencies regulating in other 
areas, they are, on balance, deferring more to agencies performing national 
security functions.43 
Part III explores how agencies behave within this uniquely permissive 
legal regime. When legal constraints are weak, it is especially important to 
understand how agencies are influenced by the “thick political surround” in 
which they operate.44 I draw from the political science literature on the 
military-industrial complex (MIC), which has received scant attention from 
 
39. See DICKINSON, supra note 28, at 9; AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION 
OF THE CIA, JCS, AND NSC 23 (1999). 
40. See infra Part III.C. 
41. See infra Part II.A. 
42. See infra Part II.B. 
43. See infra notes 112–26 and accompanying text. 
44. Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 












legal scholars. MIC theory offers a number of important insights for 
understanding the relevant political and institutional context.45  
Using these MIC theory insights, I construct a model of the military-
administrative complex as a vicious cycle of overregulation.46 The cycle is 
driven by what scholars of domestic regulation would identify as 
bureaucratic empire-building, 47  rent-seeking by private interests, 48  and 
agency capture. 49  The vicious cycle begins when contractors’ and 
bureaucrats’ rational incentives combine to inflate threats, driving the 
creation of new national security regulatory authority and pressure to use 
it.50 The use of that authority creates a market for intelligence validating it.51 
The validating intelligence enables more threat inflation, starting the cycle 
again, and often justifying the expansion of the MAC to encompass 
traditionally-domestic domains.52  
MIC theory’s insights also call into question one commonly-held 
justification for the administrative state—the influential “presidential 
administration” approach, which views the President as a politically-
accountable actor whose supervision and control legitimizes agency 
lawmaking. 53  A libertarian constitutionalist might draw on presidential 
 
45. See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 6–12 (charting MIC theory’s major critiques of 
governance). 
46. This echoes Justice Breyer’s early 1990s description of over-regulation in the domestic 
sphere. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 
9–11 (1993) (describing quality-of-life regulators’ tendency to overregulate high-profile, low-
probability risks). 
47. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
39 (1971) [hereinafter NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT]. For a 
sophisticated and comprehensive study of bureaucratic incentives, see JAMES Q. WILSON, 
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 68, 173 (1991) [hereinafter 
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY]. 
48. One form of rent-seeking involves an interest group gaining from redistribution caused by 
government regulation without contributing anything in return. See generally, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, 
The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUB. CHOICE 73 (2012).  
49. See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (2006) (describing an early version of capture theory focusing on public 
interest group alignment with over-regulating agencies); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2279 (2001) (“Proponents of [Reagan's executive review process] stressed the need 
. . . to guard against regulatory failures—in particular, excessive regulatory costs imposed by single-
mission agencies with ties to special interest groups and congressional committees.”). 
50. Threat inflation is “the attempt by elites to create concern for a threat that goes beyond the 
scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis would justify.” Jane K. Cramer & A. Trevor Thrall, 
Understanding Threat Inflation, in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR: THREAT 
INFLATION SINCE 9/11 (A. Trevor Thrall & Jane K. Cramer eds., 2009). I assume that the participants’ 
incentives are rational—both because it simplifies the model and because, in this context, rational choice 
explains policy distortions. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 11, at 19–21 (concluding that a rational 
bureaucrat in the national security space would inflate threats). 
51. See infra Part III.D.4. 
52. Cf. Hathaway, supra note 2, at 9 (describing how executive branch legal advisors in national 
security “arrived at decisions that, at times, stretched existing legal constraints to their breaking point”). 
53. See generally, e.g., Kagan, supra note 49. 











administration theory as a practical backstop to their formalist argument that 
national security authority—no matter how “legislative” it may appear—is 
per se Article II authority. But military-industrial complex theory indicates 
just how problematic this move would be. In contrast to most other parts of 
the federal bureaucracy, the MAC is so large, entrenched, and insulated that 
even the President must accommodate its interests much of the time.54 
Presidential administration cannot, by itself, legitimize a national security 
exception to the nondelegation doctrine.55  
Part IV plumbs the MAC model’s significance for constitutional 
libertarianism more generally. This Part makes a novel contribution by 
identifying major weaknesses in libertarian constitutional law as a legal 
reform project. There are striking similarities between MIC theory and the 
functionalist critiques of domestic regulation that undergird much of 
libertarian constitutional law. In carving out a national security exception, 
however, libertarian constitutionalists selectively ignore the functional 
insights giving their critique its greatest force.56  
And ironically, if the libertarian constitutionalists succeed in reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine with a national security exception embedded in it, 
the result could be more of what they fear—diminishment of economic 
liberty. 57  As the model in Part III predicts, unless the vicious cycle is 
broken, the MAC will continue to expand its regulatory authority even 
further into areas not traditionally associated with national security. 
Meanwhile, Congress and the Executive Branch will be tempted to elude 
the nondelegation doctrine’s reach by redefining agency mandates in 
national security terms.58 In fact, the Court’s inability to police the line 
between “national security” and “domestic” cases during the World War II 
years arguably led to the nondelegation doctrine’s exile in the first place.59  
To be clear, this Article does not offer prescriptions for how 
constitutional libertarians could mend the disjuncture between their anti-
 
54. See infra Part III.B. 
55. See Chachko, supra note 8 (making this observation without reference to MIC Theory). 
56. See infra Part III.B. Cf. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 16, at 15 (contending that Justice 
Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent urging a nondelegation doctrine revival derives its “rhetorical force,” not from 
originalism, but “from the invocation of modern thinkers who argue that delegation threatens liberty and 
erodes accountability”). 
57. For example, President Trump’s invocation of “national security” as a rationale for imposing 
tariffs is, in a globalized world, a demonstration of how national security powers can be leveraged to 
regulate the domestic economy. See infra notes 408–409 and accompanying text.  
58. See, e.g., Priscilla Alvarez, Customs and Border Protection Now Considered a ‘Security 
Agency’ Like FBI and Secret Service, CNN (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/06/politics/cb 
p-security-agency-fbi-secret-service/index.html [https://perma.cc/QZ22-DJEH]. 












administrativism and national security exceptionalism. 60  Nor does this 
Article explore the implications of the MAC model for the administrative 
state’s other critics and defenders. Those are projects for another day. I 
focus on libertarian constitutionalism because that seems to be the position 
around which a Supreme Court majority is coalescing. In any event, the 
observations and predictions are offered here with the hope that they will be 
useful—regardless of the reader’s views on the nondelegation doctrine’s 
originalist pedigree or on the desirable size of the administrative state.  
Nonetheless, two implications seem inescapable. The first is that, once 
the U.S. administrative state’s national security activities are taken into 
account, it enjoys a much stronger position than either its critics or 
defenders typically assume. Second, the nondelegation revival the Supreme 
Court seems prepared to begin would, ironically, further empower the parts 
of the administrative state that are least democratically accountable and 
exercise the highest degree of coercive power over the individual. 
I. NONDELEGATION AND LIBERTARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
This Part briefly describes libertarian constitutional law as a reform 
effort and the importance of the nondelegation doctrine to that effort. My 
focus here is necessarily a narrow one—I address the aspect troubled by, 
and anxious to reverse, the delegation of sweeping authority and broad 
discretion to agencies.61  
This hard skepticism of administrative lawmaking that is the hallmark of 
libertarian constitutionalism has been expressed by a majority of Supreme 
Court Justices and advocated for in the scholarship on which the Justices 
rely.62 If fully realized in the caselaw, this approach could lead to a radical 
downsizing of the administrative state.63 At the same time, however, these 
libertarian constitutionalists recognize an exception for the government’s 
national security activities, supporting otherwise impermissibly broad 
 
60. I do not address the numerous and thoughtful analyses proposing softer versions of the 
nondelegation doctrine and more incremental ways of constraining agency authority. See, e.g., William 
D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even) Progressives Could Like, 3 AM. CONST. 
SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 211, 213–14 (2020) (arguing for a stricter nondelegation doctrine that would 
support progressive policies); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317–
18 (2000); Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 TEX. L. REV. 975, 977 (2018). 
61. For Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, this view is a component of “libertarian 
administrative law,” which seeks to achieve libertarian constitutionalist goals by pushing both 
constitutional and sub-constitutional administrative law doctrine in ways that preserve the market 
baseline. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 17, at 398–400.  
62. See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
63. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Opinion, ‘Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-united-states.html [https: 
//perma.cc/6DZX-DLHZ]. 











delegations of authority and strong judicial deference in that realm.64 As I 
will explain in Part IV, this national security exception—what in practice 
operates as a substantive exception to a structural principle—would 
undermine the doctrine’s goals, make its application indeterminate and 
unstable, and ultimately leave a revival vulnerable to encroachment by the 
national security state. 
In this Part, I also emphasize that today’s enthusiasm for reviving the 
nondelegation doctrine is only loosely linked to formalism or originalism. 
It owes most of its force to influential contemporary theories about 
bureaucratic empire-building, rent-seeking, and agency capture. Later, in 
Part IV, I will explore the similarities between these theories and the 
critiques of the national security state advanced by military-industrial 
complex theory.  
A. Libertarian Constitutionalism 
“Libertarian Constitutional Law” can been defined in many ways.65 But 
its most commonly-invoked form is a comprehensive critique of modern 
jurisprudence, contending that much of the original constitutional order has 
been “lost” or “exiled.”66 Libertarian constitutionalists argue that the courts 
have allowed economic and property rights in particular to be trampled by 
the titanic regulatory power of Congress and agencies.67 Many scholars and 
jurists in this movement see the Lochner Era—from roughly the 1890s to 
the 1930s—as a golden age, even if they are reluctant to invoke it by name.68 
 
64. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 18.  
65. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian 
Constitutionalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 43 (2014) (“On a number of important issues, 
modern Supreme Court doctrine and liberal constitutional thought have been significantly influenced by 
pre-New Deal libertarian (or ‘classical liberal’) ideas, even if the influence is often overlooked by 
observers or unknown to those influenced.”). 
66. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN 
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014). The term “Constitution-in-exile” was coined by D.C. Circuit 
Judge Douglas Ginsburg. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1 REGULATION 83, 84 
(1995) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot] (book review). Judge Ginsburg has also argued 
that the President can and ought to play a crucial role in constraining agency authority. See, e.g., 
Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. 
L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1986) (expressing concern about agency tendencies toward overregulation and 
arguing that, through Office of Management and Budget review, the President can implement “a broad 
view of the nation’s economic interest”).  
67. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 66, at 32–52. 
68. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional 
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987) (“[T]he Supreme Court maintained an astonishingly 














Supreme Court opinions of that period frequently sounded in economic 
liberty and free-market principles.69  
Today’s libertarian constitutionalists have won some legal victories, 
persuading the Court to recognize corporations’ First Amendment Free 
Speech and Free Exercise rights—a new textual vehicle for reviving the 
anti-regulatory spirit of the Lochner Era.70 With respect to administrative 
agencies, libertarian constitutionalists seek to revive or strengthen doctrines 
that limit agency discretion and to scrap those that empower it.71 They argue 
for abandoning Chevron and other doctrines requiring judicial deference to 
many agency legal interpretations.72  
But reviving the nondelegation doctrine is at the heart of the libertarian 
constitutionalists’ anti-agency project.73 The doctrine elevates the authority 
of, and puts faith in, the wisdom of judges. It is judicially-created and 
especially attractive to those who see the courts as the proper entity to more 
aggressively police the structural separation of powers.  
B. The Nondelegation Doctrine and Libertarian Constitutionalism 
The nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from delegating 
legislative power to the Executive—full stop. From a strictly formal 
perspective, the basis for the doctrine is elegant: Article I of the Constitution 
 
The Era’s named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), in which the Court struck down 
a statute prohibiting the employment of an individual for more than sixty hours a week, holding that the 
“general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” The Lochner Era ended less than 
thirty years later when the Court reversed course and held that economic and social welfare legislation 
would receive a strong presumption of rationality. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 
392–94 (1937). 
69. See Sunstein & Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, supra note 17, at 399 (“Before 
and during the New Deal era, federal judges deployed doctrinal principles to cabin agency power, and 
many of the relevant decisions had an unmistakable libertarian tilt.”). 
70. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (recognizing religious 
beliefs of a closely held for-profit corporation); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affirming 
and strengthening corporations’ First Amendment rights of speech and corresponding rights to 
participate directly in elections); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1453 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133. 
71. See generally, e.g., Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 13.  
72. The Chevron doctrine requires that a court defer to a reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statutory provision offered by the agency charged with its implementation. See Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as 
Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1615 (2019) (“Chevron’s foundations are cracking.”) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Chevron]. The same reformers would also scrap the Auer doctrine, which requires giving deference to 
agency interpretations of their own regulations. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority decision to 
retain the doctrine while narrowing its applicability was merely a “stay of execution”). 
73. See Heinzerling, supra note 16, at 1970. 











vests all legislative powers in Congress and nowhere else.74 If we could all 
agree on what “legislative power” means, courts would have no difficulty 
in identifying legislation that violates the doctrine. But courts have had great 
difficulty deciding what it means—at least where nondelegation is 
concerned. 75  The traditional test is that, to avoid running afoul of the 
doctrine, Congress must provide the Executive Branch with an “intelligible 
principle” when delegating to agencies the authority to make law. But the 
Court has evinced very little interest in second-guessing congressional 
delegations. They have had so little interest, in fact, that the Supreme Court 
has relied on the doctrine to strike down legislation only perhaps a half-
dozen times, most recently in 1935, the apotheosis of the Lochner Era.76 
Since 1935, the Supreme Court has declined the opportunity, again and 
again, to wield the doctrine to rein in delegations of power, and it has 
rebuked lower courts that have ventured to do so.77 Some scholars argue that 
this history does not mean that the nondelegation doctrine is moribund. 
Professor Cary Coglianese contends, convincingly, that “the nondelegation 
doctrine, properly understood, concerns both the degree of discretion 
afforded to the holder of lawmaking power and the extent of the underlying 
power itself.”78  
In practice, Coglianese observes, courts applying the doctrine tend to 
find delegations constitutionally problematic when a statute (1) “authorizes 
an agency to make binding law”; (2) regulate a wide range of targets across 
the economy; (3) regulate a wide range of activities; (4) impose “severe 
 
74. Because the Constitution itself can be said to have delegated all legislative powers to 
Congress, some scholars now refer to it as the “subdelegation doctrine.” See, e.g., Gary Lawson, “I’m 
Leavin’ It (All) up to You”: Gundy and the (Sort-of) Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018-
2019 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 31–32 [hereinafter Lawson, Gundy]. 
75. See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Supplemental Paper to: “A Critical Assessment of the Originalist 
Case Against Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real 
Estate in the 1790s” 9 (C. Boyden Gray Ctr. for the Study of the Admin. State, Research Paper No. 20-
17 Supplement, 2020) [hereinafter Parrillo, Supplemental Paper], https://ssrn.com/abstract=3696902 
(“[T]he difficulty of specifying and applying the nondelegation doctrine is a powerful and long-
established justification for judges who believe in the doctrine at an abstract level to refrain from 
enforcing it.”). 
76. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refin. 
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Earlier decisions include United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Store 
Co., 255 U.S. 81, 86 (1921) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting “unjust or unreasonable” 
charges for any “necessaries”); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920) (holding 
unconstitutional statutes applying state workmen’s compensation laws to admiralty cases); Washington 
v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (same); see also Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, 
The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 383 (2017) (arguing that “[t]here was 
no golden age in which the courts enforced a robust nondelegation doctrine” and “[t]he federal courts 
never posed a significant obstacle to the development of the administrative state and the delegation of 
extensive policymaking authority”). 
77. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001). 













penalties” directly on “individuals and businesses”; (5) regulate according 
to a broad principle; and (6) dispense with “normal administrative 
procedures” or their equivalent.79 
With this thicker, penumbral conception of the nondelegation doctrine in 
mind, one can argue, as Professor Coglianese and others do, that courts have 
not yet again found legislation that violates the doctrine because Congress 
has been careful not to delegate too much discretion and too much power, 
even when the legislation in question may appear to lack an “intelligible 
principle.”80 
But libertarian constitutionalists have not given up on the courts making 
it a regular practice of striking down legislation on nondelegation grounds.81 
And they seem to have won over a Supreme Court majority. Five 
conservative Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, 
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—have already expressed both skepticism of 
Chevron’s continuing validity and an interest in wielding the nondelegation 
doctrine to strike down legislation when the right opportunity arrives.82 
Scholars have uncovered some evidence linking a version of the 
nondelegation doctrine to the Founding and early history of the United 
States.83 Indeed, Professor Ilan Wurman has observed, influential members 
of the Founding generation argued against the constitutionality of even 
some delegations of foreign-affairs authority. 84  On the other hand, as 
Professors Julian Davis Mortenson, Nicholas Bagley, and Nicholas Parrillo 
have pointed out, such protestations seem to lie, for the most part, on the 
fringes of the critical debates of the period. In the bigger picture, Professors 
Mortenson and Bagley conclude, “the Constitution at the Founding 
contained no discernable, legalized prohibition on delegations of legislative 
power, at least so long as the exercise of that power remained subject to 
 
79. See id. at 1864–68. 
80. See id. at 1849 (“The nondelegation doctrine has mattered more in U.S. constitutional history 
for what courts have not done with it than for what they have.”); see also Lawson, Gundy, supra note 
74, at 31–32; Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death 
Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1310 (2003); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“We still regularly rein in Congress’s efforts to delegate 
legislative power; we just call what we’re doing by different names.”). 
81. See, e.g., Lawson, Gundy, supra note 74, at 33. 
82. See supra note 16; Sunstein, Chevron, supra note 72; Lawson, Gundy, supra note 74. 
83. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 80, at 1310; Gary Lawson, Delegation and 
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002); Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Wurman, Nondelegation]; Aaron Gordon, Note, Nondelegation, 12 
N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718, 744–50 (2019). 
84. See, e.g., Wurman, Nondelegation, supra note 83 (manuscript at 20–21) (discussing James 
Madison’s nondelegation-based arguments against the Alien Friends Acts). 











congressional oversight and control.” 85  In any event, the question of 
whether there is originalist support for the doctrine is only now being fully 
engaged. And a Supreme Court majority seems already to have made up its 
mind. The originalists are very late to the party. 
Instead, functionalism—what a leading libertarian constitutionalist, 
Professor David Schoenbrod, called “necessity”—has played the dominant 
role in the development of libertarian constitutionalism and its growing 
influence.86 The pragmatic groundwork for the current wave of libertarian 
constitutionalism was laid by law and economics-oriented criticism of 
domestic regulation, which moved from the fringe to prominence in 
academic and public discourse during the 1970s.87 These critiques of the 
regulatory process overthrew the New Deal consensus that agencies were 
populated by technocrats who used their knowledge and wisdom to identify 
the correct solution to policy challenges and generally regulated in the 
public interest.88  
The authors of these critiques typically asserted that bureaucrats’ 
incentives drove them to overregulate. 89  The public choice field that 
emerged from their work, not surprisingly, had an anti-regulatory 
predisposition.90 Professor William Niskanen, in a much-cited 1971 study, 
hypothesized that bureaucrats seek to maximize their own utility by 
increasing their agencies’ budgets. 91  Larger budgets meant increases in 
 
85. Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 16, at 4; see also Christine Kexel Chabot, The Lost History 
of Delegation at the Founding (July 17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3654 
564; Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against Administrative 
Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate in the 1790s, 130 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=36968 
60 (arguing that the direct tax legislation of 1798 demonstrates that Congress delegated rulemaking 
authority that was both “coercive and domestic”); Harold J. Krent, Delegation and Its Discontents, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 710, 738 (1994) (reviewing SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra 
note 21) (“[T]he early history of the republic furnishes scant support for vigorous enforcement of a 
nondelegation doctrine.”). 
86. See Mortenson & Bagley, supra note 16, at 15 (observing that the “rhetorical force” of Justice 
Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent “comes from the invocation of modern thinkers who argue that delegation 
threatens liberty and erodes accountability”); infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text. 
87. See Roger Pilon, On the Origins of the Modern Libertarian Legal Movement, 16 CHAP. L. 
REV. 255, 268 (2013) (discussing the close relationship between “libertarian legal theory,” which has 
deep roots in the common law, and “modern law and economics”); STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE 
CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 90–135 (2008); see also RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE 
AND PUBLIC LAW 2–8 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010) (tracing the development 
of economic public choice theory from its inception to present day). 
88. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO 
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 3–4 (1997). 
89. See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 49, at 1263. 
90. See id. at 1261–62. 













“salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, [and 
the] output of the bureau . . . .”92  
These scholars also argued that regulated entities hijacked the regulatory 
process for their own benefit—they engaged in rent-seeking.93  And the 
agencies became “captured” by outside forces, which drove them to 
overregulate. Delegation of broad authority to agencies abetted these 
practices.94 
When Ronald Reagan became President, these critics of regulation—
quite a few current or future libertarian constitutionalists among them—saw 
the presidency as a means of checking the overreaching domestic 
administrative state.95 Douglas Ginsburg, whom Reagan would appoint to 
the D.C. Circuit in 1986, and who later coined the phrase “Constitution-in-
exile,” served as OIRA Administrator in Reagan’s first term and helped lead 
the deregulatory charge.96 In 1993, then-Judge Stephen Breyer made his 
own contribution to the literature, observing that bureaucrats tend to 
overregulate concerning rare, high-profile risks.97 
The more-or-less consistent trend since the 1970s has involved both the 
loosening of regulations to let the free market function and outsourcing 
government functions to private firms.98 Americans’ trust in government 
has never really recovered from its dramatic decline in the 1970s, even if 
they do rely on it to provide them with essential services.99 
But constitutional libertarians, inspired by these free market critiques, do 
not generally extend their skepticism to the federal government’s national 
security activities. Indeed, they would continue the tradition of exempting 
“foreign affairs” and “national security” matters from delegation 
constraints. They sidestep nondelegation questions in national security by 
pointing to the President’s independent Article II powers. 100  When 
Congress delegates power that, under the Constitution, belongs to both 
political branches or the President alone, the reasoning goes, nondelegation 
problems are not presented because the executive branch already has at least 
 
92. Id. at 38. 
93. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3, 3 (1971) (arguing that “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit”). 
94. THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED 
STATES 93 (2d ed. 1979) (“Delegation of power provides the legal basis for rendering a statute tentative 
enough to keep the political process in good working order all the way down . . . .”). 
95. See, e.g., Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed?, 8 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 121, 142–43 (2016). 
96. See generally DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 66. 
97. See BREYER, supra note 46, at 9–11. 
98. See MICHAELS, supra note 14, at 86. 
99. See id. 
100. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2143–44 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 











some of the delegated power. For example, Congress’s power to declare war 
mixes with the President’s authority as Commander-in-Chief, justifying 
very broad congressional delegations of lawmaking authority in wartime.101  
The importance of the distinction between “foreign affairs” and domestic 
delegations of lawmaking power was made clear by the Supreme Court in 
1936—a year after the two occasions it actually deployed the nondelegation 
doctrine to strike down legislation.102 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., the Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to a joint 
resolution empowering the President to enforce a criminal prohibition on 
the sale of arms in the United States to countries engaged in a war in South 
America.103 The resolution was narrow in scope, but gave the President 
extremely broad discretion—he could choose when to impose the embargo 
and when to end it, and could make exceptions to its implementation, or set 
limits to its terms, without congressional approval.104  
The majority opinion in Curtiss-Wright was written by Justice George 
Sutherland, a proto-libertarian constitutionalist who caused trouble for the 
New Deal as one of the “Four Horsemen” hostile to expansive federal 
power.105 In this opinion, Sutherland went out of his way—and then some—
to draw a razor-sharp distinction between foreign and domestic affairs in 
constitutional law, even wandering at points into a fringe theory of extra-
constitutional powers.106 But his paean to the practical importance of an 
executive-centered constitutional foreign affairs framework became a 
mantra for executive branch lawyers and the Court itself.107 
Anticipating Curtiss-Wright’s reliance on a foreign-domestic distinction 
were cases upholding broad delegations of legislative power in the 
overlapping domains of immigration and foreign trade.108 Professor Sarah 
Cleveland traced the Lochner Era foreign-domestic distinction to 
nineteenth-century conceptions of inherent sovereign authority, which the 
 
101. See Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 21, at 1260–61; see also Lichter v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 742, 782 (1948) (“The war powers of Congress and the President are only those 
which are to be derived from the Constitution but . . . the primary implication of a war power is that it 
shall be an effective power to wage the war successfully.”); SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 21, at 40.  
102. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refin. Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
103. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936). 
104. See id. 
105. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1999). 
106. See, e.g., KOH, supra note 7, at 94 (describing “withering criticism” of Curtiss-Wright). 
107. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (describing the post-
Curtiss-Wright “historical gloss on the ‘executive Power’” of Article II, which confers on the President 
the “vast share of responsibility for the conduct of our foreign relations” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
108. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and 












Court developed to justify power over “Indians, aliens, and territories.”109 
Relatedly, Professor Mila Sohoni sees the distinction reflecting a belief in 
America’s economic liberty as a single sovereign, which matched the 
citizen’s individual liberty in a “fractal” way.110 Like the citizen, the nation 
may choose whom to contract with: it may protect its domestic market from 
external distortions caused by influxes of cheap labor or cheap goods.111  
What is important about these cases for today’s libertarian constitutional 
revival is how often they implicated individual rights, including economic 
rights. Curtiss-Wright, after all, upheld a delegation of power to interfere, 
to the point of imposing criminal penalties, with a citizen’s liberty to engage 
in commerce. The executive branch’s trade policy often interferes with an 
individual liberty to contract, and the Court’s plenary power doctrine 
justifies infringements on the immigrant’s freedom to contract for labor, 
among other fundamental rights.  
Nonetheless, today’s libertarian constitutionalists remain committed to 
Curtiss-Wright-type exceptionalism. They support vast delegations of 
lawmaking authority to the executive in foreign affairs, trade, and 
immigration—all of which today fall under the “national security” 
umbrella. 112  Even as libertarian constitutionalists urge that deference 
doctrines such as Chevron be abandoned, they also argue that courts are ill-
suited to question the administrative state’s national security factfinding or 
legal interpretations.113 They have also argued for robust application of the 
political question doctrine in foreign affairs, which further limits judicial 
review. 114  Indeed, the Supreme Court’s early adaptors of libertarian 
constitutional law, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, 
routinely deferred to national security administrative determinations115 and 
 
109. Id. at 14.  
110. Mila Sohoni, The Trump Administration and the Law of the Lochner Era, 107 GEO. L.J. 1323, 
1336–37 (2019). 
111. This is a simplified version of Prof. Sohoni’s analysis, which also traces immigration 
exceptionalism to the rights-privilege distinction, among other influences. See id.  
112. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 18; Dept. of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 
1248 & n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 1794 embargo statute involved the external relations 
of the United States, so the determination it authorized the President to make arguably did not involve 
an exercise of core legislative power.” (citing, inter alia, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 
299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936))); Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the 
Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 157 (2017); infra Part III.  
113. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 
B.U. L. REV. 375, 391 (2008) (arguing that the Bush administration NSA’s warrantless bulk surveillance 
programs were constitutional, regardless of congressional authorization). 
114. See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 941 (2004). 
115. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 674 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
Justices Thomas and Alito) (declaring that “[i]t is not clear where the Court derives the authority—or 
the audacity—to contradict” the President’s determination regarding what constituted a military 
necessity); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) (“[A] consistent administrative construction of [The 
 











expressed somewhat Lochnerian views concerning the rights of immigrants 
and foreign nationals.116 
In any event, it seems clear the national security exception would remain 
firmly embedded in a revived nondelegation doctrine. Justice Gorsuch, 
whose Gundy dissent was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas—
and whose nondelegation views could soon enjoy majority support—
explicitly recognized the continuing validity of a “foreign affairs” 
exception. 117  Justice Gorsuch observed that “Congress’s legislative 
authority sometimes overlaps with authority the Constitution separately 
vests in another branch.”118 And when a “foreign-affairs-related” statute is 
under review, he reasoned, no nondelegation problem “may arise” when 
“the discretion is to be exercised over matters already within the scope of 
executive power.” 119  For these propositions, Justice Gorsuch cited four 
opinions—including Sutherland’s Curtiss-Wright majority and two others 
dealing with national security, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Loving v. 
United States, 120  and Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in 
Youngstown.121 In the fourth case, The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United 
States, from 1813, the Court had upheld President James Madison’s order 
 
Passport Act] must be followed by the courts ‘unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.’ 
This is especially so in the areas of foreign policy and national security, where congressional silence is 
not to be equated with congressional disapproval.”) (citation omitted). See also Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule, The New Coke: On the Plural Aims of Administrative Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 
49–53 (describing Justice Scalia as “a pioneer in” invoking “tyranny prevention” in setting “legal 
limitations on the administrative state,” and discussing Justice Thomas’s strong constitutional libertarian 
views).  
116. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 841 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by 
C.J. Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito) (“There is simply no support for the Court’s assertion that 
constitutional rights extend to aliens held outside U.S. sovereign territory . . . and . . . the privilege of 
habeas corpus does not extend to aliens abroad.”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 
271 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (interpreting previous cases as providing “only that aliens receive 
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed 
substantial connections with this country”). 
117. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2143 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
a provision of a statute establishing registration and notice requirements regarding sex offenders was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority because it gave “the Attorney General unfettered 
discretion to decide which requirements to impose on which pre-Act offenders”). 
118. Id. at 2137.  
119. Id. (citing Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 20, at 1260). I discuss the 
influence of this article and Professor Schoenbrod’s work more generally below. See infra notes 131– 
42 and accompanying text. 
120. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (concluding that “it would be contrary to 
the respect owed the President as Commander in Chief to hold that he may not be given wide discretion 
and authority” over courts martial). 
121. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(observing that “[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or 
conjunction with those of Congress” and that, “[w]hen the president acts pursuant to an express or 
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses 
in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate” (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 












barring trade with Great Britain against a nondelegation challenge on the 
ground that the President was enforcing a statute rather than engaging in 
lawmaking.122 Justice Gorsuch observed, however, that, even if the order 
did involve “lawmaking” of a sort, it could have been upheld as an exercise 
of the President’s Article II foreign affairs authority.123  
Justice Gorsuch went on to conclude that the statute under review in 
Gundy did not delegate any executive power because it “gives the Attorney 
General the authority to ‘prescrib[e] the rules by which the duties and rights’ 
of citizens are determined, a quintessentially legislative power.”124 Justice 
Gorsuch’s assumptions seem to be that (1) no constitutional delegation of 
foreign affairs authority could have the effect of empowering the executive 
to determine citizens’ rights and that (2) there is a clear, discernable line 
between domestic and foreign affairs.125 
These assumptions are inaccurate for several reasons. First, as I 
discussed above, even during the Lochner Era, the Court, in trade cases and 
in Curtiss-Wright itself, previously upheld delegations to the President of 
foreign-affairs-related authority to prescribe the rules by which the duties 
and rights—economic and otherwise—of citizens are determined.126 And in 
the Aurora case, the plaintiff was an American citizen seeking to recover 
what he contended was his seized property: the only reason the case did not 
wind up involving a direct exercise of foreign affairs authority to determine 
the private rights of an American citizen was that the plaintiff failed to 
present any evidence that he actually owned the property in question.127 
The modern Court has continued to bless the subordination of citizens’ 
property and due process rights to delegated executive foreign affairs 
authority. Libertarian constitutionalist Justice William Rehnquist, in 1981, 
wrote an opinion for the Court approving delegations of broad emergency 
economic power to the President that enable the creation, through sole 
 
122. The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States (The Aurora), 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388–
89 (1813). 
123. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 21, at 31. 
124. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossier ed., 1961)).  
125. Professor Schoenbrod, whose work seems to have provided the blueprint for the 
nondelegation views Justice Gorsuch expressed in his opinion, also describes “lawmaking” and the 
President’s Article II authority over “foreign affairs” and “national defense” as mutually exclusive. See 
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 21, at 106, 186. See also id. at 186 
(“Whatever the appropriate scope of executive powers in matters of war and foreign affairs, granting 
such powers can be reconciled with forbidding the delegation to the executive of the power to make 
rules regulating domestic conduct. The Framers sought to create a government whose efficiency in 
dealing with foreign powers was sufficient to protect the commonwealth and whose efficiency in dealing 
with its own citizens was tempered because of concern for their liberty.”). 
126. See supra notes 102–116 and accompanying text.  
127. See The Aurora, 11 U.S. at 388. 











executive agreements, of a legal regime regulating citizens’ property rights 
and even their ability to sue for compensation in U.S. courts when their 
property has been confiscated by a foreign government.128 And in 2020, the 
Court declined to hear an appeal from a decision rejecting a nondelegation 
challenge to statutes authorizing the President to impose tariffs and quotas 
on imports that he determined would “threaten to impair the national 
security.”129 And these are situations where the courts actually evaluated the 
exercise of authority; in many more situations, the courts play no role. As I 
discuss in Part II, because judicial review of foreign affairs matters is 
sporadic and highly deferential, agencies are often the last word on the 
determination of those rights.130 
But the second and more important difficulty for Justice Gorsuch’s 
reasoning is that the foreign-domestic distinction has become increasingly 
blurred, and therefore much more challenging to delineate in any particular 
case.131 And yet a revival of the nondelegation doctrine with a national 
security exception depends for its success on the courts’ policing that 
distinction, with the legislation’s constitutionality hanging in the balance. 
This is more than your typical boundary problem. To begin with, the 
Constitution’s allocation of powers between the executive and the 
legislature more generally remains a hotly-contested issue, even among 
originalists. 132  Moreover, for courts to determine whether a legal issue 
belongs in the realm of the foreign or the domestic, they must delve into the 
very thickets of national security fact and policy that they frequently assert 
they lack the expertise to evaluate.133 
The enormous challenges of this discernment were recognized by none 
other than Professor David Schoenbrod, a prominent academic figure in 
 
128. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981) (upholding, as valid exercises 
of statutory and constitutional power, “various Executive Orders and regulations by which the President 
nullified attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the United States, directed that these assets be 
transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against Iran that may be presented to an International Claims 
Tribunal”). The opinion is not clear whether the authority to suspend citizens’ legal claims derived from 
Article II, from authority delegated by Congress, or some combination of the two. 
129. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 806 F. 
App’x 982 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, No. 2019-1727, 2020 WL 3405872 (U.S. June 22, 2020). 
130. See infra Part II. 
131. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1230, 1258 (2007) (observing that “the explosion of international lawmaking, economic globalization, 
transnational flows of people, and transborder information flows occasioned by the transformation of 
communications technology” “have radically increased the number of cases [in U.S. courts] that directly 
implicate foreign relations”). 
132. See id. at 1259; D. A. Jeremy Telman, All That Is Liquidated Melts into Air: Five Meta-
Interpretive Issues, 24 BARRY L. REV. 1, 15 (2019). 
133. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (Reinterating that, in 
weighing the military’s expressed interest against environmental or other interests, the courts must “give 
great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance 












libertarian constitutional law.134 Professor Schoenbrod published a seminal 
text, Power Without Responsibility, 135  in 1993, which inspired Judge 
Douglas Ginsburg, in reviewing it, to coin the term “Constitution-in-
exile.” 136  And Justice Gorsuch, when describing the “foreign affairs” 
exception to the nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent, relied on an 
earlier article by Professor Schoenbrod as his sole secondary source.137 
In the article relied on by Justice Gorsuch, Professor Schoenbrod set 
forth the textualist and structural justifications for a foreign affairs 
exception: it was rooted in the delegation of executive, rather than 
legislative, power.138  But unlike Justice Gorsuch, Professor Schoenbrod 
went on to acknowledge the difficulty of articulating a definition of 
“executive power” in the foreign affairs context that does not sometimes 
encompass “the allocation of rights and duties within the nation.”139 He 
began with the outmoded observation that “the primary issue in foreign 
affairs is, in theory, not allocation of rights and duties within the nation but 
competition between this nation and others.” 140  He then offered the 
possibility that delegating to the President power over domestic rights and 
duties could be justified if it was “incidental to the international aspects” of 
the delegated power. In the end, however, he concluded that “[t]reating the 
Executive’s war and treaty powers as nonlegislative can be justified solely 
on grounds of national necessity”—citing, for support, the World War II 
Japanese Internment cases.141 
A national security exception whose endpoint is Korematsu—an 
anticanonical case repudiated by the same Roberts Court now looking at a 
nondelegation revival—requires serious rethinking. In any event, as I will 
discuss in Part III, advancing globalization and changing methods of 
warfare make drawing a consistent line between foreign and domestic cases 
far more challenging today than in 1985, when Professor Schoenbrod 
offered his proposal for reviving a strict nondelegation doctrine.142 Treating 
all national security delegations as delegations of executive power—no 
matter how vague the grant of authority and no matter its potential to 
 
134. See, e.g., Brian J. Glenn, Conservatives and American Political Development, 125 POL. SCI. 
Q. 611, 623 (Winter 2010–11). 
135. See SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 21. 
136. See Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, supra note 66. 
137. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing 
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 21, at 1260). 
138. See Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 21, at 1261–62. 
139. Id. at 1261. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) and 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943)). He added that “[t]his power does not, however, 
go so far as to suspend the Bill of Rights.” Id. at 1261 n.207. 
142. See infra Part III.C. 











determine the rights and privileges of citizens—would be to recognize an 
exception that could swallow the nondelegation rule. I discuss this 
possibility in Part IV.  
The only way for courts to avoid this outcome would be to apply the 
doctrine relatively equally to all delegations of lawmaking power. This 
would require courts to change their approach to evaluating national 
security delegation, which I discuss in Part II.  
II. NATIONAL SECURITY DELEGATION 
Administrative law both empowers agency action and constrains agency 
behavior.143 Congress, the courts, and the President have delegated maximal 
discretion to agencies operating in the national security space while 
subjecting them to minimal scrutiny. From this permissive framework 
emerged the MAC—an opaque regulatory state intertwined with influential 
private contractors and largely insulated from oversight, public 
participation, and accountability.144  
It is true that many delegations of national security authority comply with 
the formal requirements of the nondelegation doctrine. A statute that 
provides for the triggering of certain consequences upon a specific 
presidential finding, for example.145 
But many more delegations of national security authority—if they were 
not national security-related—would likely run afoul of the nondelegation 
doctrine. These delegations often lack “intelligible principles” to guide 
agency discretion. And even those that arguably provide such principles 
nonetheless delegate to agencies an enormous amount of power—vast 
discretion, authority to issue binding rules, and the ability to bring highly 
intrusive enforcement actions. This delegated authority extends to nearly 
every aspect of American life and to every individual and corporation. The 
exercise of these authorities may result in the death, imprisonment, or exile 
of the targeted individual.146  
In addition, with these legal features, the MAC fails to meet the standards 
by which many legal scholars would test the administrative state’s 
 
143. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 
119 YALE L.J. 1362, 1470 (2010) (“[A]dministrative law both constitutes and empowers administrative 
action at the same time that it structures and constrains administrative behavior . . . .”). 
144. Cf. ZEGART, supra note 39, at 23. 
145. See generally Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825 (2019). 
146. Cary Coglianese has identified, in addition to the “intelligible principle” test, five additional 
factors courts use in determining whether a delegation is so extensive in “size and shape” that it qualifies 












legitimacy. 147  But these features should trouble the libertarian 
constitutionalist most of all.  
A. Maximal Discretion 
Congress created much of the modern national security state through the 
National Security Act at the same time it established the modern 
administrative law regime through the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).148 These two statutes, enacted a year apart, reflect the conflicting 
concerns occupying legislators, the Truman Administration, and American 
society. Drafted and debated in the years just after World War II, they 
together embody a perceived need to contend with totalitarian regimes on 
their own terms abroad while—somehow—preserving liberty at home.
149
 It 
was widely believed that national security therefore demanded a closed, 
militarized, and centralized process—just the opposite of the transparency, 
public participation, and judicial oversight that were enshrined in the APA 
to boost Americans’ confidence in the administrative state.150  
The organic statutes establishing “domestic” agencies, such as the FCC 
and the SEC, defined their mandates in very broad terms—much to the 
 
147. In an earlier article, I argued that the lack of notice-and-comment requirements for most 
forms of national security rulemaking is constitutionally suspect and undermines the democratic 
legitimacy of the resulting rules. See generally Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, supra note 37. 
Although I lack the space here to offer an assessment of how the MAC would fare under various 
justifications for the administrative state, its unique features make it problematic under most. See, e.g., 
Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative Lawmaking, 46 
GA. L. REV. 117, 159 (2011) (“[W]hen Congress delegates lawmaking authority to administrative 
agencies, structural due process requires that agency lawmakers be subject to meaningful political 
accountability and that persons adversely affected by agency action have an opportunity to test the 
constitutional adequacy of Congress’s delegation through judicial review.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic 
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that a 
theory of civic republicanism, based on participation and deliberation, best justifies the bureaucratic 
state); Sidney Shapiro, Elizabeth Fisher & Wendy Wagner, The Enlightenment of Administrative Law: 
Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (2012) (arguing for an 
alternative model of administrative legitimacy based on expertise, deliberation, and reason-giving). But 
see, e.g., Ashley S. Deeks, Secret Reason-Giving, 129 YALE L.J. 612, 616 (2020) (arguing that reason-
giving enables even secret lawmaking to constrain decisionmakers and legitimizes their decisions).  
148. See MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR, GOVERNING SECURITY: THE HIDDEN ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN SECURITY AGENCIES 10–12 (2013); Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, supra note 37, 
at 910–20 (assessing congressional and executive branch discussion about national security during the 
long legislative history of the APA).  
149. See DOUGLAS T. STUART, CREATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE: A HISTORY OF THE 
LAW THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 41–42, 70–71 (2008) (describing how the U.S. government’s 
organizational failures prior to, and during, World War II influenced the design of the National Security 
Act); see also AARON L. FRIEDBERG, IN THE SHADOW OF THE GARRISON STATE: AMERICA’S ANTI-
STATISM AND ITS COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY 3–4 (2000) (arguing that the U.S. largely succeeded at 
that mission during the Cold War). 
150. See Knowles, National Security Rulemaking, supra note 37, at 910. 











chagrin of libertarian constitutionalists.151 But the National Security Act of 
1947 is the vaguest organic statute of them all.152 It restructured institutions 
and created new ones in an attempt to centralize national security 
decisionmaking.153 But it gave the CIA, the NSA, and the National Security 
Council (NSC) vague mandates to gather intelligence for national security 
purposes.154 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has long 
performed many crucial national security functions, had no statutory 
mandate to do so for most of its history.155  
Congress imposed very few explicit restrictions on, or judicial 
supervision of, these agencies’ national security activities until the mid-
1970s.156 And that post-Vietnam, post-Watergate period was an aberration: 
Congress has since legislated more often to increase and centralize national 
security authority than to restrain or disperse it.157 The Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 did restrict domestic surveillance and required 
approval from a newly-created Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for 
certain methods and targets.158 But post-9/11 statutes largely expanded the 
government’s surveillance authority.159  
Congress also restructured the military so that its operational 
components have broader policymaking power, greater discretion, and less 
 
151. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Lawson, supra note 83, at 340). See also infra Part III.A. 
152. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); see also STUART, supra note 149, at 110–11. 
153. See STUART, supra note 149, at 41–42. 
154. See Rascoff, supra note 8, at 699 (“[T]he CIA’s organic law is breathtakingly short on 
detail . . . .”). 
155. See id. (“[T]he FBI lacks a basic legislative charter altogether . . . .”); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow 
Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 
70–71.  
156. Zachary K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff, Introduction: The New Intelligence Oversight, in 
GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT: GOVERNING SECURITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Zachary 
K. Goldman & Samuel J. Rascoff eds., 2016). 
157. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-458, 
118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (among other things, 
creating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and restructuring the intelligence 
community to increase coordination and centralization of intelligence-gathering). 
158. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1855). 
159. See, e.g., USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified 
in scattered sections of the U.S. Code) (imposing some new limits on the bulk collection of 
telecommunication metadata on U.S. citizens by American intelligence agencies); 50 U.S.C. § 1842(c) 
(lowering the standard for obtaining internet metadata so that the FBI need only certify to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) that the information likely to be obtained is “relevant to an 
ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities”); 
50 U.S.C. § 1861 (the so-called “business records” provision); 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (allowing the 
government to acquire foreign intelligence by obtaining the content of communications by non-U.S. 
persons “reasonably believed” to be outside U.S. borders, and interpreted to authorize the collection of 












scrutiny of their activities.160 The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act revamped 
the military chain of command so that combatant commanders—who lead 
military operations—report directly to the Secretary of Defense, reducing 
the authority of the Secretary’s civilian subordinates. 161  The combatant 
commanders have since played an outsize role in conducting and even 
shaping foreign policy.162 At the same time, Goldwater-Nichols established 
a separate chain of command for the military components performing non-
operations functions—such as equipping, training, and housing personnel 
and “staffing” them to the combatant commands.163 Congress focuses its 
budgeting and oversight attention primarily on these non-operations 
functions—especially weapons programs—which leaves the operational 
military with enormous discretion and little oversight.164  
Moreover, when the national security state engages in the use of force, 
the source and scope of its mandate to do so has typically been even 
murkier.165 The President may order the use of force in some circumstances 
without specific statutory authorization and with minimal congressional 
involvement. 166  Even when Congress explicitly authorizes the use of 
military force by statute, it typically grants authority in broad, vague 
terms.167  The Uniform Code of Military Justice, with certain important 
exceptions, concerns the internal governance of the military bureaucracy, 
rather than the ways in which the military regulates externally.168  
In general, then, the national security bureaucracy has very broad 
discretion to regulate with the use of force as it sees fit, so long as it complies 
with the President’s relevant orders and its own interpretations of 
 
160. See Mark Patrick Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L. REV. 905, 
927 (2019).  
161. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 162 (altering the power and roles of several operational military actors); 
see also Nevitt, supra note 160, at 926–32. 
162. See Nevitt, supra note 160, at 907–08; Derek S. Reveron & Michelle D. Gavin, America’s 
Viceroys, in AMERICA'S VICEROYS: THE MILITARY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 1, 2 (Derek S. Reveron 
ed., 2004). 
163. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 5013. 
164. See Nevitt, supra note 160, at 913–14. 
165. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive Dynamic: 
International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 689, 693 
(2016) (observing that the interrelated development of the international and domestic legal regimes 
governing the use of force has been practice-based). 
166. See, e.g., id. at 691. 
167. See Scott M. Sullivan, Interpreting Force Authorization, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 242 
(2015) (“[AUMFs] explode into the legal landscape with supernova intensity, briefly outshine the 
broader legal constellation and, at their birth, are bound only by the functional concerns surrounding 
armed conflict.”).  
168. See, e.g., Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEO. L.J. 681, 761 
(2014) (detailing how accountability and punishment operate under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice). 











international law. 169  Similarly, as Professor Kathleen Claussen has 
explained, the U.S. trade bureaucracy, centered in the powerful Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, develops rules with vast discretion and very 
limited judicial oversight.170 
After 9/11, Congress gave a tremendous boost to the MAC’s interest in 
expanding its domain to include traditionally nonmilitary government 
functions. In 2004, The Homeland Security Act created the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)—an administrative goliath that “melded the 
functions of twenty-two previously existing agencies, from Treasury’s 
Customs Service, to Agriculture’s Plum Island Animal Disease Center, to 
the previously independent Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).”171 The new agency had “come to encompass functions ranging 
from international child labor investigations to marine fuel leaks . . . .”172 
Congress’s goal in creating such a heterogeneous and far-flung agency was 
to unite “under a single department those elements within the government 
whose primary responsibility is to secure the United States homeland.”173 
The statutory mandate of DHS was to “prevent terrorist attacks.”174 
By yoking hundreds of traditionally nonmilitary regulatory domains to a 
single counterterrorism mandate, Congress imported large swaths of the 
federal bureaucracy—the regulation of passenger screening, chemical 
safety, and immigration enforcement, for example—into the national 
security state. Not surprisingly, then, DHS’s counterterrorism mission—
which from 2002 until 2018 was the centerpiece of America’s national 
defense strategy—has come to supplant the previous missions of its 
component parts.175 A clear example of this is in immigration enforcement, 
where two DHS sub-agencies, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), have begun conducting what 
is essentially a domestic counter-insurgency operation using many of the 
same methods, equipment, strategies, and contractors as the DoD.176 
 
169. Id. at 763 (“[T]he process [of targeted killing] is unaccountable because the killings are 
beyond the reach of courts, making Executive Branch officials ‘judge, jury[,] and executioner.’”). 
170. See Kathleen Claussen, Trade Administration, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
171. Dara Kay Cohen, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar & Barry R. Wingast, Crisis Bureaucracy: 
Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 676 (2006). 
172. Id. at 696. 
173. H.R. REP. NO. 107-609, pt. 1, at 63 (2002). 
174. 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1)(A).  
175. Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal Agencies, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 53, 103 (2014) (concluding from a study of the DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and 
Civil Liberties that it is inherently difficult to induce agencies to execute both a primary mission and 
constraints on that mission). 
176. See Wadie E. Said, Law Enforcement in the American Security State, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 819, 
823–28 (noting the migration of counterinsurgency strategy from its use abroad to its use in the United 













Even before immigration enforcement agencies became part of the 
national security state, they already operated in a regulatory space in which 
Congress has delegated broad discretion to agencies, and the President’s 
Article II authority is believed to provide constitutional support for that 
delegation. 177  Although ex ante enforcement is governed by a prolix 
statutory framework, ex post enforcement is not. Congress, by periodically 
expanding the ways in which immigrants are eligible for removal and 
stripping them of their procedural rights, has left the executive branch with 
vast authority over ex post enforcement, which, due to the large numbers of 
undocumented immigrants, has an immense impact in determining the 
composition of the immigrant population.178  
B. Minimal Scrutiny 
Three major features of national security law insulate agencies in the that 
space from scrutiny—secrecy, procedural exceptionalism, and judicial 
deference. 
Much of administrative law regarding national security is rendered in 
secret.179  This aspect has only become more pronounced over time. By 
2009, 1,074 U.S. government organizations worked on programs at the top 
secret level alone.180 The number of agencies and employees working on 
merely “secret” level programs is surely much larger.181  Agencies with 
national security missions and even many without—such as the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA)—rely on Freedom of Information Act 
 
comprehensive survey of recent trends in immigration enforcement, see generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD 
WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF TRUMP (2019). 
177. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 
YALE L.J. 104, 133–35 (2015). 
178. See id. at 131–35.  
179. See Dakota S. Rudesill, Coming to Terms with Secret Law, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 241, 249–
50 (2015) (describing congressional processes that produce secret legislation); see generally GEOFFREY 
R. STONE, TOP SECRET: WHEN OUR GOVERNMENT KEEPS US IN THE DARK 5–44 (2007). Examples of 
statutes that authorize secret rulemaking include 50 U.S.C.. §§ 831–832 (providing limitations and 
guidelines on who has access to classified information at the NSA); § 3024(g) (holding the Director of 
National Intelligence accountable for safeguarding intelligence information from disclosure); § 3161 
(governing the process of classifying information and accessing classified information); § 3365 (limiting 
the dissemination of privileged information); § 3121 (punishing individuals who reveal the identity of 
undercover agents and classified information); and § 3142 (allowing operational files of the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency to be kept secret from the public).  
180. PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 10, at 86.  
181. See id. at 86-87 (describing the expansion of government organizations at the secret level 
post-9/11). 











(FOIA) exemptions to withhold information and issue Glomar responses, 
neither confirming nor denying the information’s existence.182  
Secret government activities, by their very nature, cannot involve the 
broad participation and corresponding accountability—either to the public 
or Congress—that are frequently invoked to legitimize the administrative 
state and give it constitutional validity.183 The fundamental dilemma is that 
secrecy simultaneously serves two purposes: it protects sensitive 
information from the enemy, but it also conceals lawbreaking, policy 
failures, and, as I discuss below, agency expansions of their own 
authority.184 In general, the entire bureaucracy is incentivized to keep its 
decisions as secret as possible.185 
Moreover, procedural frameworks designed to expose agency action to 
stronger public scrutiny, presidential control, and judicial review have 
almost always contained exceptions for national security activities.186 The 
APA, the “constitution of the administrative state,”187  exempts “foreign 
affairs” and “military” functions from its critical adjudication and notice-
and-comment rulemaking requirements.188  And none of its requirements 
apply to military commissions, courts martial, or to “military authority 
 
182. See Benjamin W. Cramer, Old Love for New Snoops: How Exemption 3 of the Freedom of 
Information Act Enables an Irrebuttable Presumption of Surveillance Secrecy, 23 COMM. L. & POL’Y 
91, 92 (2018); see, e.g., Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the NSA may issue a Glomar response to FOIA requests). 
183. See, e.g., Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off the Record: The National Security Council, 
Drone Killings, and Historical Accountability, 31 YALE J. ON REGUL. 363, 364–65 (2014) (“Uncertainty 
over the legal standards for the drone killing program and a lack of transparency highlight the need for 
thorough documentation as a prerequisite for meaningful oversight and accountability.”); Gillian E. 
Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 491 
(2010) [hereinafter Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law] (explaining the constitutional importance of 
the hard-look review); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 
958–59 (2007) (arguing that Chenery’s requirement of contemporaneous reason-giving plays a crucial 
role in keeping agency action within constitutional limits). 
184. See infra notes 349–58 and accompanying text. 
185. See, e.g., Jack Serle, Obama Drone Casualty Numbers a Fraction of Those Recorded by the 
Bureau, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (July 1, 2016), https://www.thebureauinvestigates.co 
m/2016/07/01/obama-drone-casualty-numbers-fraction-recorded-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/XM8K-PV 
TN] (noting the impetus to keep drone strike information secret because leaked government records 
indicated the United States was sometimes unaware of the identities of people they were killing, which 
would reflect negatively on drone operations). 
186. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1096 
(2009) (charting “black” and “grey” holes in U.S. administrative law enabling the exercise of broad 
discretion during emergencies).  
187. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining the Statutory President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 66 
(2020). 
188. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (rulemaking exemption); 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (adjudication 
exemption). Formal rulemaking as defined by the APA has become quite rare. See Edward Rubin, It’s 
Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 (2003). 
But informal adjudication in the national security space is also very light on procedural requirements. 












exercised in the field in time of war or in occupied territory.”189 Likewise, 
Executive Order 12,866, which establishes, over all U.S. government 
agency rulemaking, centralized review by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), echoes the APA by exempting “[r]egulations or rules that pertain 
to a military or foreign affairs function of the United States, other than 
procurement regulations and regulations involving the import or export of 
non-defense articles and services.”
190
  
In addition, by virtue of the exceptions in the APA and Executive Order 
12,866, national security rulemaking is also exempt from other statutory and 
regulatory requirements designed to hold agencies accountable to the public 
and policymakers. For example, many national security rules are not 
published in the “Unified Agenda,” which is intended to be a central 
database of current agency rulemaking throughout the U.S. government.
191
 
Nor are agencies required to conduct periodic review of existing national 
security regulations under the Regulatory Flexibility Act or conduct cost-
benefit analyses when they engage in national security rulemaking.
192
 
The APA also exempts the President from the definition of “agency.”193 
This is not ordinarily problematic under the “presidential administration” 
view because she is believed to be a politically accountable actor who 
exercises substantial control over agency lawmaking. 194  But, as Part II 
explains, the President lacks the capacity to exercise nearly the same level 
of control over agency action in the national security space.195 
Both the APA’s drafters and most of the administrative state’s defenders 
extol judicial review as crucial for enforcing statutory and constitutional 
 
189. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(F)–(G). 
190.  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. § 638 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601.  
191. The Unified Agenda is maintained by the Regulatory Information Center in the OIRA. See 
Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 77 Fed. Reg. 7664, 
7665 (Feb. 13, 2012) (“Executive Order 12866 does not require agencies to include [in the Unified 
Agenda] regulations concerning military or foreign affairs functions or regulations related to agency 
organization, management, or personnel matters.”). The Unified Agenda is available at http://www.regin 
fo.gov/public/do/eAgendaMain [https://perma.cc/U9VY-7B5B].  
192. These requirements are only triggered by the notice-and-comment process. See, e.g., Airports 
of Entry or Departure for Flights to and from Cuba, 76 Fed. Reg. 5058, 5060 (Jan. 28, 2011) (codified 
as amended in 8 C.F.R. § 234, 19 C.F.R. § 122) (observing that, because the national security exception 
relieved the Commerce Department from conducting notice-and-comment, “the Department does not 
consider this document to be subject to the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act”). 
193. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–706); Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (“As the APA does not expressly allow review of the 
President’s actions, we must presume that his actions are not subject to its requirements.”). 
194. See Kagan, supra note 49, at 2331–32. 
195. See infra Part II.B; see also Kovacs, supra note 187, at 67 (“A President who acts pursuant 
to a congressional delegation of authority should be subject to the same constraints as any other statutory 
delegate.”). 











limits on agency discretion.196  But federal courts have remained largely 
reluctant to review the government’s national security activities.197 They 
have traditionally relied on several doctrines—political question, 198 
standing,199 immunity,200 and the state secrets privilege,201 among others—
to avoid reviewing exercises of agency discretion. When courts have 
engaged in review, they have typically given exceptional deference to the 
national security state on matters of both fact and law. 202  It is a 
well-established legal trope that even the most complex and technically 
obscure domestic regulatory subject is more comprehensible to outside 
observers, and susceptible to second-guessing, than foreign relations and 
national security matters.203 
Although immigration is a distinct regulatory space with a distinct legal 
framework, it bears a strong resemblance to national security—a 
resemblance made even closer by Congress’s recontextualization of 
immigration as a national security function after 9/11. 204  Congressional 
grants of broad discretion leave much immigration lawmaking to the 
executive, making it largely a creature of administrative law.205 Congress 
revamps the immigration code once in a generation at most.206 Meanwhile, 
agencies shape immigration law through their interpretations and 
practices.207  
 
196. See Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law, supra note 183, at 525; Stack, supra note 183, 
at 955. 
197.  See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936) (prescribing 
exceptional deference to executive branch claims in foreign affairs); Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1362 (2009) (discussing the weight of “factual 
judgments” in national security claims); Hathaway, supra note 2. But see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid 
Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1901 (2015) (arguing 
that this form of exceptionalism is fading). 
198. See Nzelibe, supra note 114, at 945–50 (citing and discussing cases). 
199.  See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013) (holding that a group of 
U.S. reporters, attorneys, activists, and workers lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 
702 of FISA). 
200.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound National Security 
Exception to Bivens, 28 A.B.A. NAT’L SEC. L. REP. 1, 4 (2006). 
201.  See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc) (dismissing, under the state secrets doctrine, foreign nationals’ claims of harm caused by the CIA’s 
extraordinary rendition program). 
202.  See Chesney, supra note 197, at 1366-85 (detailing numerous instances of national security 
fact deference in judicial decisions post-9/11); Hathaway, supra note 2. 
203.  See Chesney, supra note 197, at 1366-85. 
204. See supra notes 175–178 and accompanying text. 
205. See Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration Law, 64 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 565, 567 (2012). 
206. See generally DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES: THE POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 
CONTROL IN AMERICA (2002) (describing the passage of major immigration reform measures in 
American history). 
207. See Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 












Moreover, courts give agency action in immigration a wide berth.208 The 
courts have often hewed to a “plenary power doctrine” under which they 
defer to congressional and executive authority over immigration, 
particularly in matters concerning the admission or removal of 
noncitizens.209 Although the plenary power doctrine is often articulated in 
ways that conflate the political branches’ authority, long stretches of 
congressional silence on the substance of immigration law have enabled the 
President and, even more so, the bureaucracy to benefit the most from the 
plenary power doctrine and other forms of immigration exceptionalism.210 
To be sure, conservative Justices on the Supreme Court have in recent 
years rejected some executive branch interpretations of foreign affairs 
law.211 And majorities of the Court declined to defer to executive fact-
finding and legal interpretation in the Guantánamo cases, insisting that 
habeas corpus applies to claims by noncitizens detained at the naval base.212  
But in most recent decisions, the Roberts Court’s conservative majority 
has followed the tradition of limiting scrutiny of national security-related 
decisionmaking. For example, it refused to recognize a Bivens action against 
officials for post-9/11 detention abuses on the ground that it would call into 
question high-level government policies following the attacks,213 or against 
a CBP agent for the cross-border killing of a Mexican national because 
doing so would affect foreign relations and “implicates . . . national 
security”; 214 and it declined to interrogate the process leading to President 
Trump’s ban on immigration from several predominantly-Muslim 
countries.215  
 
208. See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 583, 584–85 (2017) (“The Supreme Court’s [immigration law] jurisprudence is littered with 
special . . . doctrines that depart from mainstream constitutional norms.”).  
209. See, e.g., LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE 
SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 31 (1995). 
210. See Kim, supra note 207, at 101 (“[T]he power to promulgate national immigration policy is 
increasingly exercised less by Congress, and more by the officials populating our nation’s administrative 
agencies.”). 
211. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 526 (2008) (rejecting the President’s attempts to 
enforce a treaty provision against state governments and rejecting his interpretation that the treaty was 
self-executing).  
212. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 730 (2008) (holding that Congress’s attempt to 
eliminate habeas corpus for accused non-citizen enemy combatants at Guantánamo Bay was 
unconstitutional); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 624 (2006) (declaring unlawful the military 
commissions established to try certain enemy combatants for war crimes); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 509 (2004) (holding that citizen-detainees possessed the right to challenge their detention using 
habeas); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that alien detainees at Guantánamo had a 
statutory right to invoke habeas jurisdiction). 
213. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017). 
214. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 745–46 (2020). 
215. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018). 











Relatedly, when lower courts enjoined, pending appeal, the 
implementation of restrictions on immigrant rights and the redirection of 
appropriated funds to finance a border wall, the Court took the unusual step 
of intervening to lift the injunctions. The reasoning behind these 
interventions is presumably that, at least with respect to national security 
matters, any pause in implementation of government policy causes it 
irreparable harm.216  
The judiciary’s reluctance to scrutinize the national security state’s 
activities has produced a body of national security administrative law that 
is unusually tractable. Lack of judicial interpretation allows rules to morph 
over time into standards—they “resist particularization.”217 The perceived 
need for a particular national security authority creates a market for legal 
interpretation justifying it. 
In conclusion, the legal frameworks empowering agencies as lawmakers 
and insulating them from searching judicial review are even more pro-
agency in the national security space. These unique qualities of national 
security law are mutually reinforcing. Congress gives agencies conducting 
national security activities broad and vague mandates, while also exempting 
much of those activities from the procedural requirements imposed on the 
rest of the administrative state. The national security bureaucracy, operating 
in secret and rarely burdened by the APA’s procedural requirements—
which were designed to ensure deliberation and public participation in 
regulatory activities—need not, and does not, produce a record suitable for 
meaningful judicial review.218 The courts, without clear statutory principles 
against which to evaluate the legality of agency action or a useful record, 
and believing in the unique expertise of national security bureaucrats, shy 
away from reviewing agency decision-making altogether in the national 
security realm. And the national security bureaucrats, in turn, without 
significant judicial (or congressional) scrutiny, have few incentives to alter 
their regulatory processes to make them accessible or susceptible to judicial 
review. And so on.  
 
216. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV. 
123, 126–27 (2019). 
217. See Jonathan Hafetz, A Problem of Standards?: Another Perspective on Secret Law, 57 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 2141, 2173 (2016). 
218.  See generally Stack, supra note 183 (arguing that agencies’ contemporaneous reason giving 
provides the administrative state with constitutional legitimacy); Stephen F. Williams, “Hybrid 
Rulemaking” Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 401, 456 (1975) (“[Courts] may demand that agencies develop a record that enables a reviewing 












III. THE MILITARY-ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEX 
This Part introduces a model of how agencies regulate within the 
uniquely permissive national security legal regime charted in Part II. This 
Part begins by describing the institutional and political environment in 
which these agencies operate, drawing on military-industrial complex 
(MIC) theory—a still-vibrant political science literature that has received 
scant attention from legal scholars.219  
What is especially interesting is that MIC theory made, in the national 
security context, many of the same observations about bureaucracy and the 
influence of private firms that, when identified in the domestic context, 
would serve as the functional foundation for libertarian administrative law: 
much of what MIC theory essentially depicts are bureaucratic empire 
building, regulatory capture, and rent-seeking. 220  The most elegant and 
useful MIC analyses assume that the participants in the process have 
rational incentives rather than being corrupt, regularly engaged in unlawful 
behavior, or even infected by “hawkish biases.”221 In fact, these models are 
compelling because they explain the pathologies that rational incentives 
produce in the MIC’s institutional and political settings.222 
Moreover, as I discuss in the second subpart, MIC theory offers a crucial 
insight: the President has a limited ability to control and monitor the MIC 
process and, therefore, a limited ability to supervise the national security 
bureaucracy in a way that would endow the process with democratic 
legitimacy.223  
 
219. See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 6–12 (describing the major strains of MIC theory). For 
recent contributions to the literature that address post-9/11 developments, see, e.g., ISMAEL HOSSEIN-
ZADEH, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. MILITARISM (2006); Robert Pollin & Heidi Garrett-Peltier, 
The U.S. Employment Effects of Military and Domestic Spending Priorities: An Updated Analysis, POL. 
ECON. RSCH. INST. (Oct. 2009), https://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/published_study/spending_p 
riorities_PERI.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEC2-PHB8]; REBECCA U. THORPE, THE AMERICAN WARFARE 
STATE: THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF MILITARY SPENDING (2014). 
220. For an introduction to these concepts, see RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW, supra note 87, at 2–8. For a survey of MIC theory in its early 70s heyday that offers 
insights similar to these theories, see generally Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The Concept of the Military-
Industrial Complex: Radical Critique or Liberal Bogey, 21 SOC. PROBS. 498 (1973) (surveying political 
science literature assigning primary influence to either the military, the contractors, or the bureaucrats). 
221. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Jonathan Renshon, Hawkish Biases, in AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY AND THE POLITICS OF FEAR: THREAT INFLATION SINCE 9/11, supra note 50, at 87. 
222. See GLENNON, supra note 11, at 19–20 (concluding that a rational actor in the national 
security bureaucracy would inflate risks). 
223. See Kagan, supra note 49, at 2331–32 (contending that presidential control bestows 
legitimacy on agency action). 











The third subpart adapts these insights to an expanding national security 
space transformed by globalization and technological change.224 Warfare 
has become individualized,225 and elastic definitions of “national security” 
have led to a convergence among the MIC and other regulatory domains. 
This convergence has driven the militarization of foreign policy, 
immigration enforcement, and policing.  
The fourth subpart introduces a descriptive model of the MAC, which 
takes the form of a vicious cycle comprising six stages—(1) threat inflation 
leading to (2) new authority; (3) pressure to use that authority leading to (4) 
use of that authority; and (5) pressure to find intelligence validating the use 
of authority, which returns the cycle back to the beginning with (1) new 
threat inflation that sometimes leads to (6) expansion of the MAC’s 
regulatory domain. I describe how the six stages of the cycle play out across 
a range of regulatory activities at home and abroad. 
What emerges is a counter-model to the one subscribed to by most 
libertarian constitutionalists: it is not the President, but the bureaucrats and 
contractors who typically dominate the regulatory process in national 
security; and political and institutional incentives play a larger role than 
pure technocratic expertise. In other words, the MAC functions more or less 
the way libertarian constitutionalists believe domestic agencies do. 
A. The Military-Industrial Complex as Theory  
Eisenhower’s 1961 Farewell Address is his most famous speech because 
he invoked the “military-industrial complex.” 226  The President and his 
speechwriters did not coin the phrase, but they chose it with care and gave 
it a prominent, enduring place in the American lexicon.227 Its use served to 
synthesize a family of theories lurking in public and academic discourse for 
decades. The term “military-industrial complex” later became so popular it 
devolved into a trope, losing its distinctiveness.228 Scholars began to employ 
 
224. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 887, 
890 (2012) (“A large gap exists between the ideal-type branches imagined in eighteenth-century 
structural constitutional theory and observable realities on the twenty-first-century ground.”). 
225. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 32, at 1523. 
226. See Farewell Address, supra note 6. 
227. See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 4–5. 












other terms—such as “national security state”—to describe and critique the 
same phenomenon.229 But the original MIC theory remains quite salient.230 
From the 1960s through the 1990s, the term “military-industrial 
complex” signified both a model and critique of U.S. government 
lawmaking. Because the descriptive and normative theories are so closely 
linked, the term is almost always used pejoratively.231  As a descriptive 
matter, it portrays the military, 232  its contractors, and the intelligence 
community233 working together to advocate for increased military spending, 
the development of new military technology, hawkish foreign relations, and, 
more generally, militarized solutions to public policy challenges. 234 
Sometimes these entities were collectively described as a “power elite” 
imposing their will on the rest of America.235  
The interests of the MIC’s major players are not identical, but they are 
aligned. The military and intelligence communities seek increased prestige, 
budgets, and authority,236 while the contractors seek profit and expanding 
markets. 237  Their respective interests are blurred by their mutual 
dependence and a revolving door between government and the contractors: 
individual bureaucrats have an incentive to “expand the market demand for 
services they would be providing when they exit the government”;238 and 
contractors have an incentive to “tell the agency chiefs what they want to 
hear” to ensure their status as “‘go-to’ contractors.”239  
 
229. See generally David T. Smith, From the Military-Industrial Complex to the National Security 
State, 50 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 576 (2015) (reviewing several recent books); see also Roland, supra note 
27, at 335–37. 
230. See generally MICHAEL A. COHEN & MICAH ZENKO, CLEAR AND PRESENT SAFETY: THE 
WORLD HAS NEVER BEEN BETTER AND WHY THAT MATTERS TO AMERICANS (2019); LEDBETTER, 
supra note 29, at 188–210. 
231. For a rare exception, see generally JOHN STANLEY BAUMGARTNER, THE LONELY 
WARRIORS: CASE FOR THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1970). 
232. See C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 16–18 (1956) (identifying the military as an elite 
playing a leading role in setting government policy). 
233. The Intelligence Community today officially consists of seventeen organizations, but they 
have numerous agencies nested within them, and many other departments and agencies have 
intelligence-collection arms. See Members of the IC, OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTEL., https://www.dni.gov/inde 
x.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic [https://perma.cc/8K6B-HKVV] (noting that the intelligence 
community is composed of two independent agencies, eight Department of Defense elements, and seven 
elements of other federal departments and agencies).  
234. See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 182. 
235. See generally MILLS, supra note 232. 
236. See SEYMOUR MELMAN, PENTAGON CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR 4 
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ORDER (1966) (arguing that the huge American military machine 
serves the capitalist purposes of maintaining prosperity at home while fighting socialism abroad).  
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The term “military-industrial complex” also signified a set of critiques—
the identification of several pathologies resulting from the shared interests 
and close working relationship between the national security state and 
contractors.240 The fundamental indictment is threefold—that the MIC (1) 
inflates threats to U.S. national security,241 which enables it to (2) obtain 
and use new armaments and (3) expand its domain to include traditionally 
non-military government functions.242 More specifically, the MIC warps 
public policy in several ways. It causes trillions to be spent on unnecessary 
armaments and programs, crowding out spending on social welfare.243 It 
encourages the commingling of public and private spending in ways not 
traditionally permitted in other areas of U.S. federal policy.244 It distorts 
every aspect of the economy—influencing the type and location of 
manufacturing centers and jobs, as well as trade policy.245 It also distorts the 
goals of academia, bending universities’ research priorities toward military 
ends.246 It encourages a growing culture of secrecy.247 And it erodes civil 
liberties.248 
The traditional MIC descriptive model comes in many varieties,249 but it 
is best depicted as a vicious cycle,250 in which the incentives of contractors, 
the military, and the intelligence community combine to inflate threats to 
U.S. national security.251 Inflated threats are difficult for outsiders to deny: 
the military and intelligence communities enjoy high levels of trust and 
prestige, and they operate in a cocoon of secrecy formed by rampant 
overclassification.252 An inflated threat assessment, which is the first stage 
of the vicious cycle, provides rationales for (2) seeking more money from 
 
240. See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 7–14. 
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245. See generally, e.g., ANN MARKUSEN ET AL., THE RISE OF THE GUNBELT: THE MILITARY 
REMAPPING OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1991); see also id. at 242 (depicting Congress “as a protector 
and reinforcer of existing military economies rather than as a causal force”). 
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248. See LEDBETTER, supra note 29, at 11. 
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Congress; (3) buying more of the same arms and developing more advanced 
arms; (4) using the arms the military possesses; (5) validating the use of 
those arms afterward; and (6) expanding the military domain into 
traditionally civilian areas.253 
Many depictions of the MIC also include Congress. As I discussed 
above, Congress appropriates huge amounts for intelligence gathering and 
military operations but conducts little actual oversight of those activities.254 
Instead, Congress focuses most of its attention on the military components 
involved in weapons development, staffing, and training—which answer to 
a separate chain of command from the operational components.255 Congress 
may, at the urging of the contractors, appropriate more for certain budget 
items even than the military requests. 256  Although war is not always 
popular, the military itself is.257 A member of Congress can typically make 
a successful case to her constituents for increased defense spending, 
especially when it yields jobs in her state or district.258 But even if she 
cannot, she may depend more for reelection on contributions from the 
defense lobby than on persuading her constituents. An “iron triangle” forms, 
in which defense appropriators in Congress become integrated with the 
military and the contractors—their interests essentially aligned.259 But in 
any event, Congress usually gives the MIC what it asks for, and sometimes 
more.260  
B. The Myth of Presidential Control 
Perhaps the most important insight MIC Theory provides for 
assessments of the administrative state is the limited ability of the President 
to alter this vicious cycle. Administrative law scholarship places a great deal 
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of weight on presidential control. Because the President is answerable to a 
nationwide political constituency, the theory goes, “presidential 
administration” legitimizes the administrative state, even in the absence of 
other legitimating factors, such as public participation, judicial review, or 
congressional oversight.261  
And yet, as Dwight Eisenhower understood, even the President, who has 
far better access to secret information and expert advice than members of 
Congress, has a limited ability to influence the trajectory of national security 
policies already in place.262 The President appoints only several hundred 
civilian officials to oversee a national security bureaucracy that, with 
contractors included, employs millions. 263  The lion’s share of national 
security decisionmaking—including decisions concerning fundamental 
liberty interests, and life and death—must occur at lower levels. 
In addition, if the President seeks to rein in any particular mode of 
regulation by the MAC, she must contend with public and private 
bureaucracies heavily invested in that mode of regulation. Within the MAC, 
there are strong incentives to bury or ignore policy failures—from 
continuing to pay for expensive weapons that do not work 264  to 
undercounting collateral deaths from the use of force 265  to conducting 
missions “off the books.”266 Scaling back the level of regulation is rarely 
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considered because it is viewed as an admission of failure, which actually 
increases the threat to bureaucratic prestige.267 
This resistance to presidential control influences decisionmaking even at 
the highest levels and by political appointees. When NSC members are 
united on a particular policy, it is especially difficult for the President to say 
“no.”268 In 2009, for example, four members of the NSC—the Secretary of 
Defense, Director of National Intelligence (DNI), CIA Director, and 
National Security Advisor—formed a united front to persuade President 
Obama to continue and expand the drone program begun under President 
Bush. At the same time, they leveraged their control over information to 
“curtail discussion of the policy’s broader ramifications.”269  
This example serves as a reminder that, even when the President 
exercises direct supervisory authority over a particular decision, she must 
rely on the intelligence provided by the bureaucracy and the advice of the 
officials who lead it. The military and civilian workers in the intelligence 
community possess the same motivations as other bureaucrats—they seek 
increased budgets, authority, and prestige.270 They can rarely obtain those 
goals by reporting that all is well in the world, and if they fail to identify a 
threat, their agency will suffer serious reputational damage, as the CIA did 
after 9/11. 271  Instead, they are rationally motivated to obtain as much 
information as possible from as many sources as possible and to identify 
national security threats in the information they obtain. The military and its 
contractors’ incentives are aligned with the intelligence community’s. 
Aggressive intelligence gathering and threat inflation serve the goals of all 
three.272 
These incentives and the sheer complexity of the intelligence community 
have constrained Presidents’ efforts to exercise control over intelligence 
 
267. See Dalal, supra note 155, at 105 (“[C]hanging course implies that the existing course is 
incorrect—an admission of failure that might expose the agency to unwanted scrutiny and negatively 
implicate the agency’s top brass.”). 
268.  See GLENNON, supra note 11, at 62–64 (noting that the “president must choose his battles 
carefully . . . he has limited political capital and must spend it judiciously . . . . Under the best of 
circumstances, he can only attack . . . policies one by one, in flanking actions, and even then with no 
certainty of victory”). 
269.  See id. at 61 (discussing VALI NASR, THE DISPENSABLE NATION: AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY IN RETREAT 180 (2013)). 
270. See, e.g., Nathan Alexander Sales, Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and 
Information Sharing, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 279, 282 (2010) (observing that “[i]ntelligence agencies 
seek to maximize their influence over senior policymakers” and “autonomy—i.e., the ability to pursue 
agency priorities without outside interference”). Perhaps the most comprehensive study of bureaucrats’ 
incentives remains WILSON, BUREAUCRACY, supra note 47. 
271. TIM WEINER, LEGACY OF ASHES: THE HISTORY OF THE CIA 555 (2008) (describing 9/11 as 
“the Pearl Harbor that the CIA had been created to prevent.”). 
272. See GLENNON, supra note 11, at 19 (“The resulting incentive structure encourages the 
exaggeration of existing threats . . . .”). 











gathering.273 Recent attempts to centralize intelligence gathering have had, 
at best, mixed success. 274  More broadly, in order to exercise effective 
control over national security policy, the President must contend with and 
counterbalance the constant barrage of threat inflation influencing 
Congress, the media, and the public. This is an extremely difficult task, even 
in optimal circumstances. 
C. From a Military-Industrial to a Military-Administrative Complex 
Libertarian constitutionalists typically exclude the national security state 
from their blistering critiques of agency regulation.275 And yet many of the 
U.S. government’s most significant national security activities fall within 
the definition of regulation, and increasingly so. Like agencies that regulate 
drug manufacturers or polluters, the national security state’s core mission is 
to limit risk—to provide safety to American society by imposing 
concentrated costs on potential or actual enemies and the public.276 And like 
criminal justice agencies, the national security state often imposes those 
costs through the application of coercive power directly upon individuals—
both enemies and the public.277  
The twenty-first century focus on deterring threats from transnational 
groups and individuals has altered the U.S. government’s national security 
activities. 278  Traditional military operations—such as surveillance, 
targeting, and detention—have become borderless and individualized.279 
Sprawling bureaucracies sprang up to determine who are the enemies, 
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note 8, at 637 (arguing that “the norms of presidential control that have characterized the majority of the 
regulatory state for decades have recently begun to take hold in the domain of intelligence collection”). 
274. See, e.g., John D. Negroponte & Edward M. Wittenstein, Urgency, Opportunity, and 
Frustration: Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 28 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 379, 388 (2010) (“[The IRPTA is] a consensus piece of legislation that created a DNI 
position with broad responsibilities but only vague authorities in critical respects.”). 
275. See infra Part IV. 
276.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
12 (2008) (arguing that most democracies today have evolved into “[m]arket states,” whose “strategic 
raison d’être . . . is the protection of civilians, not simply territory or national wealth or any particular 
dynasty, class, religion, or ideology”); BREYER, supra note 46, at 9-10 (explaining that the regulatory 
system can be divided into two parts—“risk assessment” and “risk management”); cf. Emily Berman, 
Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6–7 (2014) (proposing that 
the risk-management literature be utilized to develop a more rights-protective approach to the regulation 
of domestic intelligence collection). 
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where they are located, and how to neutralize them. 280  And warfare’s 
increased tempo makes intelligence gathering more important than ever.281  
These pressures have led to a convergence among the regulatory 
domains of national security, foreign policy, immigration, and even 
policing.282 Also driving this convergence are private contractors, who sell 
equipment and services developed for one domain to the others.283  The 
consequences are the militarization of all these domains and their 
assimilation into a national security state increasingly influenced by 
contractors’ interests and entangled with American life.284 
When viewed from the perspective of its targets, then, the government’s 
national security activities are just as burdensome as regulation in other 
areas, if not more so. Indeed, the national security bureaucracy has always 
regulated individual behavior, sometimes on a very large scale—from the 
draft to blacklisting to wartime detention.285 And the internal administration 
of the bureaucracy itself involves complex and intrusive regulation of its 
individual personnel, which deserves more study.286 
Today, the concentrated costs of these national security activities are 
being imposed, with greater frequency, on American civilians and other 
individuals inside the United States.287 These costs include, among other 
things, the disruption militarized immigration enforcement and policing 
imposes on all members of communities where it occurs, 288  the 
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appropriation of private information,289 the suppression of speech,290 and, 
for targeted communities, the higher costs associated with greater scrutiny 
of their activities, infiltration by government agents, and detention.291 
The Trump administration announced a pivot away from 
counterterrorism to great-power competition as the centerpiece of U.S. 
national security policy.292 But this new grand strategy cannot turn back the 
clock. Surveillance, counterinsurgency, and other modes of warfare 
requiring extensive rulemaking and adjudication will remain crucial to U.S. 
national security strategy—regardless of the enemy.293 Because the actual 
use of force directly against another nation raises the stakes to dangerous 
heights, nations seeking to weaken U.S. power are more likely to use other 
tactics—such as surveillance, covert action, economic measures, and cyber 
operations—and the United States is likely to respond in kind.294 Moreover, 
the convergence of national security and other regulatory domains shows no 
sign of slowing down. 
D. The Vicious Cycle of the Military-Administrative Complex 
Like the MIC, the MAC manifests in a vicious cycle. The two cycles 
operate simultaneously and interdependently.295 Both cycles involve threat 
inflation as a key driver of change. But the main difference is that, in the 
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ON THE ROCKS (Dec. 19, 2019), https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/insurgency-not-war-is-chinas-most 
-likely-course-of-action/ [https://perma.cc/F67F-F6JV]. 
294. See id. 
295. The military and contractors’ pursuit of expensive new aircraft and weapons systems, for 
example, has continued unabated. See, e.g., Christian Davenport, Under Trump, the F-35’s Costs, More 















MAC cycle, threat inflation (stage one) leads to increased regulatory 
authority (stage two), rather than the purchase of new arms. The increased 
regulatory authority attracts pressure to use it (stage three) resulting in its 
actual use (stage four). The use creates a demand for validating intelligence 
(stage five). The production of new intelligence enables further threat 
inflation (back to stage one), and periodically leads to an expansion of the 
national security state’s regulatory domain (stage six).  
1. Threat Inflation 
Threat inflation in the MAC takes many of the same forms as in the MIC 
and is caused by many of the same factors. But threat inflation in the MAC 
reflects the changing nature of warfare, a “fragmented international 
environment,” 296  and broadening definitions of national security. 297  It 
centers on threats from individuals and transnational groups, rather than 
nation-states or groups contending for political power within them.298  
Although the U.S. government proclaimed in 2017 that its defense and 
national security policies would shift to focus on great power competition 
rather than terrorism, 299  its use of force aimed at non-state actors has 
continued largely undiminished—and in some respects it has even 
increased. 300  This continuity can be attributed to the entrenchment of 
bureaucracies within the national security state dedicated to particular types 
of administrative decisionmaking—such as targeted killing—that 
increasingly operate with little presidential involvement. 301  The Special 
Operations Command (SOC), for example, has resisted the shift away from 
the strikes and raids that brought it prestige, influence, and autonomy. It has 
even circumvented the chain of command to advocate for its own interests 
with Congress.302  
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Resistance to change also emerges from a heavy shared investment 
among bureaucrats, contractors, “experts,” and the media303  in inflating 
threats from terrorism.304 As recently as 2015, the elite consensus was that 
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) presented the most significant 
threat to the United States—even an existential one.305 AQAP did in fact 
launch one successful stateside attack, but the intelligence community failed 
to detect it.306 
Such inflated assessments have proved stubbornly difficult to counter, 
despite numerous studies concluding that the actual threat to the United 
States from terrorist groups is quite low.307 Threat inflation’s persistence has 
everything to do with bureaucratic incentives. Bureaucrats will—all other 
factors being equal—embrace policies enabling them to more easily 
perform a small set of core tasks while avoiding carrying out policies that 
require taking on new tasks.308  
Intelligence analysis that provides the basis for national security 
decisionmaking accordingly suffers from an overly narrow focus. As one 
former intelligence official observed, “[intelligence analysts] have little 
understanding of probability and suffer from low base rate neglect for very 
rare events.”309 Put another way, they overemphasize low-probability, high-
risk, threats.310 In addition, individual analysts gain promotion and prestige 
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when they produce reports identifying threats, not dismissing them.311 They 
are therefore unlikely to probe for alternative explanations when they see 
data consistent with a preconceived threat.312 
Similar incentives drive threat inflation concerning terrorism within the 
United States. In the panic after 9/11, the intelligence community, the 
military, and federal law enforcement made wildly inflated assessments 
about the stateside threat posed by al Qaeda and other foreign-based terror 
groups.313  
This immediate response was in many ways understandable, if not 
helpful. But the same threat inflation continued for years in the face of 
overwhelming evidence that transnational terrorist groups lacked the 
capacity to—or often even the interest in—launching further attacks on U.S. 
soil.314 In 2011, the government followed up on approximately 5,000 leads 
per day, which were internally referred to as “threats.” 315  Law 
enforcement—especially the FBI—has expended tremendous resources 
pursuing them. In fifteen years, just a few hundred prosecutions resulted, 
many from sting operations, and most on “quite minor charges.”316  On 
December 6, 2019, a Saudi aviation student with links to AQAP killed three 
and injured eight at the Pensacola Naval Air Station.317 But no other al 
Qaeda operatives or sleeper cells have been uncovered inside the United 
States.318 
Threat inflation regarding terrorist groups operating across borders 
throughout the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa—in nations all 
geographically remote from United States—puts pressure on the limits of 
authority to use force abroad.319 Similarly, high levels of threat perception 
about stateside terrorist attacks puts pressure on the boundaries of authority 
in law enforcement, domestic intelligence collection, and immigration, 
among other domains. These pressures push the vicious cycle into stage 
two—increased regulatory authority. 
2. Increased Regulatory Authority 
The increased regulatory authority occurring at stage two of the vicious 
cycle takes three forms. The first is Congress enhancing an agency’s 
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statutory authority or vesting it with new authority. The second is the 
President directing agencies to exercise greater authority, invoking powers 
granted her by statute, the Constitution, or some mixture of the two.320 The 
third—and least studied—form is agencies, on their own, using their 
existing discretion to increase the level of regulation.321  
Congress, in the wake of 9/11, has continually expanded statutory 
authority to regulate regarding national security, while only rarely imposing 
limits.322 Examples include the following: expanding surveillance scope and 
methods; 323  twice authorizing the use of force; 324  creating the Special 
Operations Command; 325  legalizing the use of military commissions at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and attempting to strip constitutional habeas 
rights from prisoners there;326 shifting much of the federal bureaucracy into 
the national security space by creating the DHS;327 and appropriating robust 
budget increases for national security. Voting against such measures was 
considered politically perilous for members of Congress from both 
parties. 328  Threat inflation—hammered home by the military, the 
intelligence community, and their contractors—has had a strong, lasting 
impact on voters and legislators.329 
When seeking increased authority from Congress has seemed too 
burdensome, politically challenging, or time-consuming, the President has 
simply invoked new authority as flowing from in existing statutory authority 
and often also executive power derived from Article II of the 
Constitution.330 Some examples include the following: in the wake of 9/11, 
 
320. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981) (recognizing presidential 
authority to suspend claims in federal courts pursuant to a sole-executive international agreement, 
grounded in similar statutory authorization and congressional acquiescence in previous instances of the 
same practice). 
321. See Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 34 (2017) (arguing that law enforcement 
agencies create new primary rules of conduct when they shift enforcement patterns); cf. Gillian E. 
Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1244–45 (2017) 
(arguing that “many internal measures” have the “paradigmatic features of legal norms even if they lack 
the element of enforcement through independent courts”).  
322. See supra Part II. 
323 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
324. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 
1498 (2002). 
325. See 10 U.S.C. § 167. 
326. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 
(2006) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
148, div. A, tit. X, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2741-42 (2005) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
2241(e)). 
327. See supra notes 171–76 and accompanying text. 
328. See, e.g., COHEN & ZENKO, supra note 230, at 5–10. 
329. See id. 
330. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 












President Bush and his Cabinet declared a national emergency, triggering 
authority to impose economic sanctions on individuals and groups; 331 
created new military commissions;332 declared limits on the applicability of 
the Geneva Conventions to captured prisoners;333 ordered the detention of 
thousands of Muslim immigrants in the United States;334 and approved the 
use of torture. 335  President Obama ramped up the drone program and 
personally presided over the process leading to strikes against certain 
individuals.336 Obama also further broadened the geographical scope of the 
war against terrorist groups, authorizing the use of force in Yemen, Somalia, 
Libya, Syria, Chad, and Niger, in addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan.337 
President Trump invoked the (again inflated) threat of terrorism to issue 
executive orders imposing travel bans 338  and used statutory emergency 
authority to reallocate military funds toward the construction of a border 
wall.339  
But the most frequent—and perhaps the most consequential—
expansions of regulatory authority occur at the agency, and even sub-
agency, level. As I discussed in Part II, legal frameworks constituting 
national security regulatory domains typically feature vague statutory 
mandates, few formal procedural requirements, secret decisionmaking, and 
limited judicial review. These features will, over time, tend to push the bulk 
of administrative lawmaking to the bottom rungs of the agency ladder. 
Professor James Q. Wilson observed that an agency’s leadership must spend 
most of its time dealing with external forces within and outside the 
Executive Branch, leaving little time left to refine its agency’s mandate.340 
The less specific an agency’s mandate, the more mid-level and front-line 
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bureaucrats are empowered to interpret it.341 And without external sources 
of supervision like judicial review, moreover, the front-end bureaucrats are 
all the more endowed with broad discretion.342 
It may seem counterintuitive, but lower-level bureaucrats typically take 
broad discretion and narrow it to an intense focus on a small set of core 
tasks.343 These tasks are defined by the problems the bureaucrats encounter 
on a daily basis, what is perceived to be the agency’s primary mission, and 
the agency’s culture.344 For most agencies operating in the national security 
space, the problems they encounter daily—what keeps them up at night—
concern threats. 345  The perceived primary mission is counterterrorism 
because it carries prestige and brings in the most money. 346  Although 
individual agency cultures vary, they have become much more 
homogenized within the national security realm by the creation of DHS and 
their common alignment toward the counterterrorism mission.347  
Much agency national security rulemaking occurs informally and at a 
low level. 348  This has been true of many rules increasing regulatory 
authority in response to threat inflation. Examples include the NSA 
expanding surveillance authority by broadening its interpretation of the term 
“facility” in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to include, not 
just a telephone number, but also a “general gateway” or “cable head”;349 
memos from a mid-level DHS official initiating a policy of indiscriminate 
deportation by ICE350 and directing, in secret, CBP agents to detain and 
interrogate citizens of Iranian descent following the targeted killing by the 
United States of an Iranian General in Iraq;351 guidance by CIA officers or 
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military commanders in the field about what indicators of insurgent 
behavior justify the launching of a “signature” drone strike;352 and an NSA 
official’s creation of an AI algorithm that leads to the collection of 
thousands of individuals’ private electronic information.353 
Lower-level bureaucrats enjoy particularly broad discretion when they 
make individualized, adjudicatory determinations. In the national security 
space, such determinations include arrest, detention, and interrogation by 
immigration enforcement officers at airports or elsewhere within the United 
States; 354  the DoD’s decision to designate a prisoner as a “enemy 
combatant”;355 the addition of a name to the “no-fly list” by a low-level 
official at one of several agencies;356 the decision by the CIA or the DoD to 
target a particular individual or group with a drone strike;357 and a decision 
by NSA officials to collect data on a particular individual.358  
The process leading to these determinations often—but not always—
involves both a sprawling public bureaucracy and an almost-as-substantial 
private bureaucracy intertwined with it. Today’s national security 
contractors provide numerous services in addition to equipment.359 They fill 
personnel gaps, gather intelligence, pilot drones, program surveillance 
software, operate detention facilities, interrogate and guard detainees, and 
undertake a host of other activities.360  
Some national security adjudications follow more formal procedures and 
provide multiple levels of internal review, due process rights, and judicial 
review. 361  But these adjudications still receive very strong judicial 
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deference. The courts rarely rule that sanctions determinations are 
unlawful.362 And the D.C. Circuit, which has “enjoy[ed] almost exclusive 
jurisdiction over national security detention,” has sided with the government 
nearly every time it has considered the legality of a Guantanamo prisoner’s 
detention.363 
Adjudication is also where presidential coordination of agency activities 
is least likely and least effective.364 For a time, President Obama and high-
level officials in several agencies had direct involvement in decisions 
regarding which individuals to target with “personality” drone strikes.365 
But the number of such strikes is relatively low compared to those 
conducted based on behavior exhibited on the ground—so-called “signature 
strikes”366—and those conducted entirely off the record.367 Under President 
Trump, these types of deadly adjudicatory determinations, like thousands of 
others in the MAC, became largely bureaucratic endeavors.368 
When statutory authority is vague, and procedural requirements and 
judicial review are weak or absent, very informal rulemaking and 
adjudication creates administrative law by accretion. In the national security 
space, the accretion of authority occurs in collaboration with the private 
contractors intimately involved in the decisionmaking. For example, private 
firms not only manufacture drones, but pilot them and provide intelligence 
supporting a decision to strike.369 The financial benefits to these private 
firms from drone strikes creates powerful incentives to increase the number 
of strikes and the geographical range of their use.370 This is one important 
way legal authority gradually expands. 
3. Pressure to Use Authority and Its Use 
In the MIC, new arms must be produced before they can be “used.” But 
when the MAC uses new regulatory authority, the process is not as linear. 
The boundaries of regulatory authority cannot be tracked with the same 
precision as the contents of a nation’s arsenal; indeed, these boundaries may 
never be known until they are challenged. And authority may never be 
identified until there is sufficient demand for it. 
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Agencies sometimes seek legislative approval for existing activities 
when doubt emerges about authority for those activities and when the 
prospects of approval are strong. The NSA had been engaging in the 
warrantless collection of Americans’ electronic communications since 
immediately after 9/11, relying initially on the President’s Article II 
authority as Commander-in-Chief, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force (AUMF), and the War Powers Resolution.371 When DOJ 
scrutiny raised concerns, subsequent surveillance statutes served, in large 
part, to place existing exercises of authority on a firmer legal foundation.372 
Similarly, the President may provide a more thorough invocation of 
expanded authority for existing activities if there is pressure to do so. For 
example, even though the CIA and the military had been conducting drone 
strikes against the leadership of terrorist organizations outside the “hot” 
zones in Afghanistan since the beginning of Obama’s Presidency, it was 
four years before the administration, in response to criticism, produced a 
framework charting the legal authority for such “direct action.”373 In order 
to justify targeting individuals in remote mountain areas who were in no 
position to launch attacks against the United States anytime soon, this legal 
framework offered a broader definition of “imminence” than had been 
previously invoked in the targeting context.374 
In still other situations, such as adjudicatory determinations, agencies 
expand their authority by using it.375 These expansions are often driven by 
bureaucrats’ narrow focus on their core, short-term tasks. Agencies “tend to 
choose the goals that are more easily measured so they can demonstrate 
progress” and “[t]his often means taking an approach that focuses on short-
term concerns with tangible outputs, as opposed to long-term effects that 
might be harder to predict and quantify . . . .”376  
In the targeting process, “enemies killed in action” is as tangible an 
output as they come. As drone attacks on insurgents in Afghanistan 
escalated, commanders turned more and more to the use of “signature 
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strikes”—those launched, not based a previous determination, after a 
lengthy process, that a named individual poses an imminent threat, but when 
“insurgent activity” has been detected and an “opportunity” for a strike 
presents itself.377 Over the course of hundreds of such signature strikes, the 
definition of “insurgent” eventually came to include virtually all military-
age males 378  and “insurgent activity” might encompass, as one State 
Department critic joked, “three guys doing jumping jacks.” 379  These 
expansions of authority dovetail with contractor incentives to sell more 
drones and related services.380 
Meanwhile, at the DHS, more than a decade before the Trump 
Administration and its aggressive bureaucratic jawboning, contractors 
worked with bureaucrats to implement a de facto indiscriminate removal 
policy. 381  The agency ramped up immigration detention and began 
outsourcing detention management to private prison companies that were 
not accountable to detainees for violations of detention standards. These 
private prison contractors were a powerful ally to ICE in congressional 
budget negotiations. Flush with government contracts, private companies 
like Geo Group and CoreCivic lobbied Congress for even more money for 
immigration enforcement.382  
In general, agencies in the national security space continue to use their 
authority aggressively. The NSA, for example, tripled its collection of text 
and call records from telecoms between 2016 and 2017, and increased 
“unmasking” the identities of Americans it surveilled in response to requests 
from other agencies. 383  The numbers of drone attacks by the Trump 
administration far outstripped even the high number conducted under the 
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Obama administration 384—and the numbers of immigrants in detention 
continues to increase.385 
4. Intelligence Validating the Use of Legal Authority and Resulting 
Threat Inflation 
National security activities inevitably involve uncertainty, and mistakes 
happen. What pre-operation intelligence indicated was a weapons factory 
may turn out to be a hospital. But if too many such mistakes are revealed, 
every entity involved in the operation suffers a setback. The military and 
intelligence community elements lose prestige.386 The mistake also taints 
the contractors’ products or services, which may even be blamed. 
That is why the military, the contractors, and the intelligence community 
share a strong interest in finding intelligence validating a previous use of 
authority. 387  In the aftermath of many combat situations, there will be 
uncertainty about whether the targets qualified as “enemies.” Was the 
“wedding party” in Northeast Afghanistan just that, or was it cover for a 
meeting of al Qaeda organizers? After every attack, when the smoke clears 
and the bodies are counted, the intelligence community and the military will 
be hunting for evidence that the individuals targeted or killed can be 
categorized as enemies.388 
The hunt for validating intelligence occurs in other regulatory contexts, 
too. Guantanamo detainees discovered that the decision to send them there 
in the first place was remarkably sticky: the defense bureaucracy and 
intelligence community had strong incentives to justify the initial 
determination. 389  The Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs)—
which ultimately determined that every detainee was an “enemy 
combatant,” sometimes after multiple do-overs—relied on questionable 
justifying intelligence, even when sources recanted.390 The annual review 
boards established to determine the continuing “dangerousness” of the 
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detainees would often pile on even less reliable information to justify a 
decision not to release a detainee.391  
Fictional sting operations are a variation on the search for validating 
intelligence. Instead of hunting for past indicators of participation in acts of 
terrorism, the fictional sting operation involves the government itself 
creating the conditions for participation.392 Such operations serve legitimate 
purposes in certain law enforcement contexts, but their use in stateside 
antiterrorism policy is problematic. The agents involved often receive 
bonuses if the operation leads to a successful prosecution, giving them an 
incentive to push the coercion envelope.393 The typical antiterrorism sting 
operation has targeted “armchair terrorists”—individuals who may be 
radicalized, but would otherwise not have the skills or inclination to 
participate in any terrorist activity. Even so, the successful prosecution is 
hailed as another attack prevented and used to further inflate the terrorism 
threat.394 
Indeed, in general, when validating intelligence demonstrates that the 
MAC is successfully addressing a national security threat, the vicious cycle 
returns to stage one, threat inflation. The success may be said to reveal a 
previously unrecognized or underappreciated threat, or it is simply used to 
emphasize the danger of the threat that began that iteration of the cycle.395 
The process then moves to stage two, increased regulatory authority, and 
repeats itself again and again. 
5. Militarization of Other Regulatory Domains 
When a threat is regarded as sufficiently serious, or if the prestige of the 
entities in the MAC has received a sufficient boost, the cycle turns to stage 
six—the expansion of the MAC’s regulatory domain. Absent a large-scale 
war, the U.S. military rarely has the opportunity to use more than a small 
portion of the arms it deploys. 396  So the military, contractors, and 
intelligence community must find ways to remind Congress, the President, 
and the public of their continuing importance. One such way is to show they 
can perform traditionally non-military functions. 397  For example, the 
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military and the CIA became expert at propaganda during the Cold War, 
often crowding out the State Department, which traditionally performed that 
task.398 The military killed two birds with one stone by crafting media that 
glorified America while linking America’s identity with the military’s.399 
This strategy eventually paid off. For the U.S. government, the MAC has 
become the hammer in a sea of nails. And no matter how diverse the 
military’s tasks have become, the major contractors have expanded their 
portfolios accordingly. Lockheed Martin, for example, operates the world’s 
largest private intelligence agency, which conducts surveillance and 
engages in covert action.400 At one time or another, Lockheed subsidiaries 
have recruited and trained interrogators, security screeners, drone pilots, and 
spies, as well as foreign judges and lawyers. Other subsidiaries provide 
much of the equipment agencies use for these tasks.401 
But the nature of the “complex” in the MAC is that influence moves in 
both directions. The many, many corporate entities contracting with the 
government to perform national security functions often must agree to 
surrender their accountability and duty to shareholders.402 The DoD installs 
its handpicked directors on the boards of these corporations, who influence 
decisionmaking and monitor corporate activities so they do not conflict with 
the government’s national security policies.403  
Counterterrorism strategy complements the MAC’s interest in 
expanding its regulatory domain. Counterinsurgency—a mode of warfare 
that seeks to incapacitate the enemy by undermining its support among the 
people it depends on for resources—has been a key part of U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy since before 9/11.404 It involves the military and 
contractors performing a wide range of government functions. The 
progressive branch of counterinsurgency seeks to build popular support by 
shoring up the rule of law and essential services, “ensuring civilian 
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security,” and, if necessary, revising public policies or even a nation’s basic 
law.405 
AFRICOM, the military’s Africa Command, has taken this 
comprehensive mission to heart. Its goal is to be the one stop shop for U.S. 
policy on the continent—what it calls the “whole-of-government 
approach.”406 It borrows (“attachés”) senior officials from other agencies—
including Agriculture, Energy, and Commerce—and claims “responsibility 
for development, public health, professional and security training, and other 
humanitarian tasks.”407  
Even as the United States pivots from counter-terrorism to great power 
rivalry, agencies will pursue the new grand strategy, at least in part, through 
the regulation of individuals—including Americans. President Trump used 
statutory authority to impose tariffs on China—a foreign-affairs-based 
administrative decision to subsidize a particular U.S. industry at the expense 
of others and the consumer.408 In doing so, the President also authorized the 
Commerce Secretary to issue waivers for individual corporations—a form 
of agency adjudication.409 
Within the United States, the MAC has expanded its regulatory domain 
in a different way—through the militarization of law enforcement. In an 
apparent attempt to use threat inflation about terrorism to rally support for 
restrictive immigration policies, the Trump administration often elided 
distinctions among terrorists, drug traffickers, transnational gangs, and 
undocumented immigrants.410  In fact, a small subgroup of unauthorized 
immigrants actually engage in criminal activity or represent national 
security threats.411  
Agencies whose activities have a domestic center of gravity—such as the 
FBI, DEA, ICE, and CBP—hug the counterterrorism mission to increase 
their status and budgets. These agencies adopt many of the military’s tactics, 
even when they are not appropriate to the task. Because these agencies 
conduct operations more directly intertwined with American life than the 
military’s, the resulting infringement of liberty is more apparent and more 
common.  
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Many of DHS’s regulatory activities bear the hallmarks of a counter-
insurgency campaign whose goal is to deny support to, and discourage, the 
“enemy.”412 ICE makes arrests and raids in formerly safe locations like 
schools and courts,413 conducts surveillance and covert operations,414 uses 
U.S. citizens as bait to capture their undocumented relatives, 415  and 
retaliates against those who resist its policies. 416  When ICE separates 
families, detains immigrants in harsh conditions, and deports them to 
countries where they face life-threatening dangers, it aims to deter 
unauthorized immigration and encourage “self-deportation.”417 
DHS also leverages the breadth of its mandate by using regulatory 
authority in one domain to coerce compliance in another. In doing so, it 
regulates the broader population more heavily in pursuit of its national 
security mission. It seeks to punish “sanctuary” cities and states, for 
example418—CBP stopped processing applications or renewals by New 
York residents for its Trusted Traveler programs when the state enacted a 
law preventing ICE and CBP from accessing its DMV records.419 The state 
sued DHS, alleging infringements of state sovereignty and equal 
protection.420  
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A constant throughout this vicious cycle is “panvasive” surveillance by 
the MAC, which has secondary rights-diminishing effects beyond the 
warrantless collection and use of Americans’ private communications.421 
The fear of this surveillance interferes with the work of journalists and 
lawyers. Sources are more reluctant to come forward, and clients are more 
reluctant to share information with their attorneys.422 The MAC’s regulatory 
activities have a wide and deep impact on the American community. 
IV. THE MILITARY-ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEX AND LIBERTARIAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
This Part briefly explores the interaction between the MAC and 
libertarian constitutionalism, focusing on a prospective revival of a strict 
nondelegation doctrine. As I discussed in Part I, libertarian 
constitutionalism emerged from nostalgia for a Lochnernian judiciary that 
would protect economic liberty, combined with public choice critiques of 
domestic regulation. And yet the critique of regulatory power embodied in 
Military-Industrial Complex theory has attracted little interest from 
libertarian constitutionalists. In this Part, I assess the tension between the 
sweeping, invasive nature of the MAC’s regulatory activities and libertarian 
constitutionalists’ ardent insistence on rolling back the administrative 
state.423 In the end, the failure to resolve this tension would undermine the 
libertarian constitutionalists’ reform project. Moreover, it would further 
embolden the part of the administrative state most in need of restraint. 
As I discussed in Part I, libertarian constitutionalists and other 
originalists have made efforts to ground their critiques of the administrative 
state in the Constitution’s text and structure. But the evidence is susceptible 
to conflicting interpretations.424 Indeed, a great deal of the indeterminacy 
surrounding originalist support for the nondelegation doctrine flows from 
the fact that the many of the controversial early delegations of rulemaking 
authority concerned foreign affairs and national security. 425  The 
nondelegation-based objections to bills delegating authority to impose 
embargos, raise a volunteer army, and remove and detain aliens simply do 
not square with the nondelegation doctrine as it existed in the Lochner Era—
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with its Curtiss-Wright national security exception—or the doctrine the 
conservative justices would now revive.426 
For Professor Schoenbrod, whose article Justice Gorsuch relied on in 
articulating the national security exception in his Gundy dissent, the failure 
to distinguish between national security and domestic delegations presented 
a mortal danger to the nondelegation doctrine. Professor Schoenbrod 
observed that the Court, in the two 1935 cases deploying the doctrine to 
strike down New Deal legislation regulating the domestic economy, 
mistakenly relied on precedent involving exercises of foreign affairs 
power—in other words, executive power.427 It was a serious mistake, he 
argued, for the Court not to mark this distinction; when it upheld the 
delegation of vast administrative authority to control the domestic economy 
during World War II, the Court stretched the “intelligible principle” concept 
so far that no one raised a nondelegation challenge again until the 1960s.428 
Put differently, what should have been a set of cases regarding solely the 
delegation of executive power, and limited to the national security context 
in which they arose, were instead treated like any other delegation of 
authority to regulate the domestic economy. “[T]he Court has had little 
success,” he lamented, “in preventing the precedents of war from becoming 
precedents of peace.”429  
As I discussed in Part III, policing the foreign affairs-domestic line and 
discerning the limits of “executive power” in the foreign affairs realm are 
tasks for which an elegant theoretical model is poorly suited. Instead, it is 
the insights from critiques of agency regulation that should presumably 
inform applications of the nondelegation doctrine. This is where Military-
Industrial Complex theory and the evolution of the military-administrative 
complex becomes especially important.  
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It would be anachronistic to conclude that MIC theory and these 
domestic regulatory critiques share common roots. MIC theory emerged 
from the political left and became a mature and sophisticated model of 
government by the 1950s, when conservative public choice scholars were 
tinkering with their first models of domestic regulation.  
Moreover, these scholars’ mounting attacks on the domestic 
administrative state had very little to say about the MIC. 430  Professor 
Gordon Tullock, who wrote groundbreaking work on rent-seeking, seemed 
ambivalent about the MIC, even though it presented a clear example of his 
own theory in action. In advocating for outsourcing, he wrote that, “What is 
sometimes called the military-industrial complex produces, on the whole 
(with some exceptions), excellent military equipment; but there seems to be 
no doubt that the costs are a good deal higher than they have to be.”431 
Tullock’s comment highlights an important distinction between MIC theory 
and most public choice prescriptions. For the public choice theorist, 
outsourcing results in better outcomes and strengthens the free market, 
enhancing liberty. For the MIC theorist, in contrast, a close working 
relationship between the government and private firms is inherently 
dangerous and anti-democratic.  
Most of the time, however, libertarian constitutionalists simply did not 
address regulation by the national security state, perhaps assuming that it 
was not really part of the administrative state they were attacking. This was 
a serious oversight.  
MIC theory and libertarian constitutional law share pessimistic views of 
government regulation that assume bureaucrats are rationally motivated to 
expand their budgets and build their prestige, rather than further the public 
interest. 432  Because the MAC distorts the free market and encourages 
agencies to overregulate, libertarian constitutionalists should be especially 
interested in reforming it. But they are not. The national security state is still 
treated as exceptional by the same scholars and jurists seeking to tame the 
administrative state. Even as courts weaken their deference toward agencies 
regulating in other areas, they continue to recognize, even lean into, 
deference toward agency action in the national security space.  
This strange disjuncture lays bare three major flaws in libertarian 
constitutionalism. First, a descriptive model of the administrative state that 
omits a large portion of agency action is radically incomplete. To place all 
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national security activities in the “executive power” category and thereby 
exempt them from the nondelegation doctrine was always going to be a 
problematic approach, even before the latest wave of globalization.433 But 
the Supreme Court has already once gone down the path of approving, in 
wartime, broad delegations of authority to determine citizens’ economic 
rights with few procedural requirements, and it has continued to do so in 
peacetime. There is little indication the Court would not again take the same 
path with a revived nondelegation doctrine. 
Second, the exceptional treatment libertarian constitutionalists afford the 
MAC displays an unwillingness to fully embrace the theories of regulatory 
capture and bureaucratic incentives—the very insights giving libertarian 
constitutional law its greatest force. 434  The libertarians’ faith in the 
legitimacy and technocratic competence of national security 
decisionmaking mirrors liberal faith in domestic regulation during the New 
Deal. 435  Yet a belief that national security bureaucrats are, somehow, 
fundamentally different cannot be sustained in the face of vanishing 
boundaries between the domestic and national security realms.436  
And finally, the libertarians’ omission of the MAC from their critique 
makes clear that their conception of constitutional liberty is quite thin. It is 
primarily focused on economic and religious liberty, rather than the liberties 
most frequently infringed by the MAC—including privacy, freedom from 
restraint, and the right to travel. 437  And yet with respect to economic 
regulation as well, what was once exclusively domestic can become very 
quickly a matter of national security and part of the land of the exception. 
For example, the U.S. military has long studied climate change as a national 
security threat, and the potential for securitized environmentalism to 
transform the economic regulatory landscape for corporations is immense. 
Professor Sarah E. Light has argued that “[t]he Military-Environmental 
Complex . . . has the potential to transform some of the negatives of the 
historic military-industrial complex into positives for the environment and 
sustainability.” 438  So too can national security imperatives infringe on 
religious freedom, as the Muslim-American community can attest.  
What the behavior of the MAC teaches is that the most effective way to 
rein in the administrative state is to apply ordinary administrative law 
constraints to regulation by the national security state. “Normalizing” 
national security law in this way would enable courts to effectively police 
 
433. See supra Part II. 
434. See supra Part III.B. 
435. See MASHAW, supra note 88, at 10–11. 
436. See supra Part II.A. 
437. See supra Part III.D. 
438. Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879, 884 (2014). 











the separation of powers and protect liberty. Once this has been 
accomplished, courts and scholars can consider whether some form of a 
strengthened nondelegation doctrine would truly be necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2000, after a relatively peaceful decade that saw the Soviet Union 
collapse, one scholar published a triumphalist assessment of the Cold War 
years, arguing that fears of a “garrison state” expressed by Eisenhower and 
others had never come to pass because the United States had outspent the 
Soviet Union militarily while “anti-statist” internal forces largely preserved 
individual liberty.439 Twenty years later, that assessment seemed premature 
at best. After the 9/11 attacks, U.S. military spending again exploded, 
returning to Cold War levels as a percentage of the budget, where it has 
remained ever since.440 Outsourcing of traditional military and intelligence 
functions proceeded at a furious clip, further integrating the national 
security state and its contractors.441 And the changing nature of warfare and 
technological innovation expanded the scope of the military’s regulation of 
individuals, transforming what had once been a MIC into a MAC.442  
This growing phenomenon should be part of any assessment scholars 
make about the strength of the American administrative state. The way in 
which the MAC operates should also inform our understanding about the 
genuine consequences of a nondelegation revival. Neither the libertarian 
constitutionalists nor the regulatory state’s defenders can afford to ignore it. 
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